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NOTE
INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION IN AN AGE OF
GENETIC PATENTING: RECOGNIZING AN
EMERGING HUMAN RIGHTS NORM
Kara H. Ching
INTRODUCTION
Genes and the information they contain are fundamental building
blocks of a people's identity. Genetic research on groups of people
occasionally results in lucrative biotechnology patents. For example,
approximately half of the inhabitants of the South Atlantic island of
Tristan da Cunha suffer from asthma.' Researchers from the San Di-
ego biotechnology firm Sequana Therapeutics collected genetic mate-
rial from this group and located a genetic mutation.' The German
company Boehringer Ingelheim funded the research and bought this
ground-breaking information for $70 million.3 From this information,
Boehringer Ingelheim plans to develop a treatment to effectively alle-
viate asthma symptoms.4 Researchers have recently targeted indige-
nous peoples5 for genetic study because their heightened isolation
1. See Asthma-Related Gene Found in Study on Small Island, Firm Says, LA.
Tunes, May 21, 1997, at A18 [hereinafter Asthma-Related Gene]. The inhabitants of
this island are not indigenous, but the example is meant to illustrate that genetic re-
search involving relatively isolated groups can prove to be lucrative.
2. Id.
3. Id.; see Paul Salopek, Genes Offer Sampling of Hope and Fear, Chi. Trib., Apr.
28, 1997, at 8.
4. Asthma-Related Gene, supra note 1.
5. Defining indigenous groups is difficult. See Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indige-
nous Peoples and the UN Conunission on Human Rights: A Case of the Immovable
Object and the Irresistible Force, 18 Hum. Rts. Q. 782, 791-94 (1996). The following is
one definition from the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a his-
torical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed
on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the
societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at
present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, de-
velop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their
ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in ac-
cordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal
systems.
Special Rapporteur Josd R. Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination
Against Indigenous Populations, at 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.21986f7IAdd.4, U.N.
Sales No. E.86.XIV.3 (1987); see also, Julian Burger, Gaia Atlas of First Peoples 20
(1990) ("Although indigenous people vary widely in their customs, culture, and im-
pact on the land, all consider the Earth a Parent and revere it accordingly. 'Mother
Earth' is the center of the universe, the core of their culture, the origin of their iden-
tity as a people."); Jose P. Kastrup, The Internationalization of Indigenous Rights from
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
may have resulted in unique genetic traits of increased resistance or
susceptibility to disease.6
There are many competing interests in the arena of sampling and
patenting of indigenous peoples' genetic material. Genetic research
has the potential to yield diagnostic tools and cures for diseases, and
many people suffering from or predisposed to these diseases stand to
benefit. Other potential beneficiaries include scientists, pharmaceuti-
cal companies, and the larger health industry, all of which could profit
from a successful product. In addition, anthropologists, geneticists,
and indigenous peoples could learn more about the migratory history
of indigenous tribes through genetic research.7
Notwithstanding these potential benefits, indigenous peoples have
concerns about the procurement and use of their genetic materials.,
Many are worried about researchers obtaining genetic samples with-
out the informed consent of their subjects.9 Some of these peoples'
religious or philosophic beliefs do not permit the patenting of life.10
No avenues exist for these peoples to enjoin the patenting of their
genetic material. No mechanisms beyond private contract currently
ensure that the indigenous donors will be adequately compensated, or
compensated at all, for their contribution. Moreover, many indige-
nous people may never have access to medical advances based on
their own genetic material because they do not live near medical
facilities.
The following hypotheticals demonstrate some of the potential con-
troversies. Suppose that a private U.S.-based company (the "Com-
pany") sent researchers (the "Researchers") into three indigenous
communities. Samples were gathered from the first group ("Group
One") by a physician at a health clinic in the course of unrelated rou-
tine treatment with no remuneration, where the subjects were una-
ware that their samples would be used in research. The physician was
working with Researchers who were interested in this indigenous
the Environmental and Human Rights Perspective, 32 Tex. Int'l L.J. 97, 99-102 (1997)
(comparing international and U.S. definitions of indigenous peoples).
For an overview of indigenous rights issues, see S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peo-
ples in International Law (1996) [hereinafter Indigenous Peoples in International
Law], S. James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary International Law,
8 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1 (1991), and Steven C. Perkins, Indigenous Peoples and
International Organizations: Issues and Responses, 23 Int'l J. Legal Info. 217 (1995).
6. See Salopek, supra note 3, at 8; see also L.L. Cavalli-Sforza et al., Call for a
Worldwide Survey of Human Genetic Diversity: A Vanishing Opportunity for the
Human Genome Project, 11 Genomics 490 (1991) ("Isolated human populations con-
tain much more informative genetic records than more recent, urban ones.").
7. See, e.g., Ann Gibbons, The Peopling of the Americas, Science, Oct. 4, 1996, at
31 (describing new theories of the prehistoric migration of people from Asia to North
and South America that are based, in part, on genetic research of indigenous
peoples).
8. See infra Parts I.C. & I.D.
9. See, e.g., infra note 43 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., infra note 66 and accompanying text.
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group and gave the samples to them. Samples were also taken from
Groups Two and Three. Unlike with Group One, however, the Re-
searchers told the second group that their blood samples would be
used in research in exchange for some nominal consideration. The
Researchers stated, without further explanation, that there was a re-
mote chance that they would develop and patent a product derived
from the samples. Group Three, in contrast, was given an in-depth
explanation of genetics and patenting. The researchers obtained per-
mission from the traditional leaders and each individual, agreeing that
a fixed share of any resulting profits would be returned to the group.
Researchers were surprised to find that members of all three tribes
possessed a genetic makeup that was critical in the development of
potentially lucrative patentable products. Without informing the
tribes or individual donees, the Company applied for, and the United
States granted, patents for the products. Some time later, members of
the tribes became aware of the patents and notified both the Com-
pany and the United States that they objected to the patents. There
were no individual dissenters to the Groups' decisions to object.
Group One members complained because they had not been in-
formed or given their permission for that use of their genetic material,
nor had they received remuneration. Members of Group Two ad-
vanced ethical objections because genetic research violated their be-
lief that people should not tamper with nature. Group Three
members dissented because they believed they were inadequately
compensated under the agreement.
This Note explores how the law can help indigenous peoples obtain
meaningful control of their genetic material. Part I will briefly discuss
the background of genetics, life patents, and indigenous groups. Part
II sets out the domestic common law and international human rights
law and demonstrates that neither currently provide adequate protec-
tion for indigenous peoples. Part III considers the human right of self-
determination in the context of indigenous research and patenting,
and illustrates that an emerging international norm recognizes an in-
digenous people's right to control their genetic material. Part IV ar-
gues that Congress should pass legislation to adequately meet the
human rights needs of indigenous peoples generated by the rapid ad-
vancement of biotechnology. This Note concludes that congressional
action to protect indigenous peoples is consistent with domestic and
international law, and is a natural advancement of human rights and
responsible state action.
PART I. BACKGROUND
Genetics is intriguing because genes hold answers to some of life's
mysteries. Scientists study human genes hoping to discover some in-
sight into genetic diseases that will alleviate human suffering. Some
genetic research has aroused interest in the genes of indigenous peo-
19971
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ples who have been isolated and unexposed to a larger gene pool. Re-
cent genetic research of indigenous people, however, has raised
several serious concerns about its appropriateness. This part begins
by providing a brief overview of genetic research and life patents, and
continues by identifying competing interests and illustrating some of
the concerns surrounding indigenous genetic research with specific
examples.
A. Genetic Research
Genes contain the well-hidden secrets of human frailties and
strengths." The human genome is genetic information encoded in de-
oxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") which is found tightly coiled in the chro-
mosomes of each human cell.' 2 The human genome consists of a long
sequence of nucleotide bases which contain approximately three bil-
lion base pairs. 3 Some stretches of the nucleotides form the 50,000-
100,000 genes found in human cells, while the rest are "junk" DNA,
not currently expressed in humans.'4 Genes are stretches of DNA
that contain the code to produce a protein.S Proteins are the material
of cellular structure and they also determine most chemical reactions
in the body.'6
The scientific community has found many applications for genetic
information. For example, scientists value the development of cell
lines because these lines enable them to conduct controlled studies.' 7
Researchers seek to develop diagnostic tools to detect genetic defects
or predisposition to genetic diseases that could lead to medical inter-
vention."8 Another goal of genetic research is protein production,
11. See Leon Jaroff, The Gene Hunt, Time, Mar. 20, 1989, at 62, 63, 67 (quoting
former head of the National Institute of Health, James Watson, in regard to human
genome mapping: "We can have at our disposal the ultimate tool for understanding
ourselves at the molecular level.... We used to think our fate was in our stars. Now
we know, in large measure, our fate is in our genes.").
12. DNA is a molecule that forms a double helix of four base nucleotides that pair
off: adenine with thymine and guanine with cytosine. See Robert Cook-Deegan, The
Gene Wars: Science, Politics, and the Human Genome 19 (1994) (describing the
double helix as a spiral staircase). For much more in-depth and technical explana-
tions of DNA, genes, and cells, see Bruce Alberts et al., Molecular Biology of the Cell
(3d ed. 1994), and James D. Watson et al., Molecular Biology of the Gene (4th ed.
1987).
13. Thomas F. Lee, Gene Future: The Promise and Perils of the New Biology 14
(1993).
14. Some geneticists believe that these long stretches of DNA may have had func-
tions in the past that have since been obviated by evolution. Id.
15. Cook-Deegan, supra note 12, at 19.
16. Id.
17. Cell lines aid genetic study by fostering a stable environment for research be-
cause the same cells can be infinitely reproduced. See Jean de Vellis, Ownership of
Cell Lines, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 697 (1991) (explaining the development and use of cell
lines).
18. See, e.g., Visible Genetics Receives United States Patents for p53 and RB1 Can-
cer Gene Tests, Biotech Pat. News, Sept. 1, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8691838
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which is a vital method of replacing necessary proteins when genetic
diseases inhibit their normal production. 19 Ultimately, researchers
seek to develop cures and preventatives for the many diseases that
have a genetic basis, ranging from cancer to diabetes, heart disease to
sickle cell anemia.2'
To achieve these goals, scientists have set out to map the entire
human genome.2 1 The goal of mapping is to sequence all of the nucle-
otide base pairs and determine the location of genes." Because genes
are at the root of many diseases, scientists want to identify links be-
tween genetic markers and the location of a disease-producing gene
on chromosomes.' Mapping and determining the genetic sequence of
a critical gene could make possible a diagnosis or identification of a
predisposition, cure, or preventative measure.24 The Human Genome
Project ("Genome Project"), a worldwide network of genetic re-
searchers, has developed a systematic plan to coordinate the complete
mapping of the human genome. 5
(describing test kits that provide fast, inexpensive detection of genetic mutations asso-
dated with cancer, which leads to early intervention).
19. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Fischer, American Home Products Will Buy the Rest of
Genetics Institute, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1996, at D4 ("Genetics Institute ... is best
known for a genetically engineered replacement therapy, sold as Recombinate, for
the blood-dotting protein that hemophiliacs lack.").
20. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Fischer, Bottling tie Stuff of Dreams: Gains in Gene
Therapy Encourage the Industry, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1995, at D1 (examining gene
therapy companies that are working to correct genetic defects that cause disease by
generating proteins that stimulate the immune system or replace damaged genes).
21. Scientists began mapping the human genome in 1911 with the study of color-
blindness. Cook-Deegan, supra note 12, at 31. The mapping became more systematic
in 1980 when an article was published in the American Journal of Human Genetics
suggesting a method for identifying and organizing chromosome markers. David Bot-
stein et al., Construction of a Genetic Linkage Map in Man Using Restriction Fragment
Length Polymorphism, 32 Am. J. Hum. Genetics 314 (1980); see Cook-Deegan, supra
note 12, at 29. For a short history of gene mapping, see Victor A. McKusick, The
Human Genome Project Plans, Status, and tie Application in Biology and Medicine,
in Gene Mapping 18, 20-26 (George J. Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992). For a
more in-depth treatment, see generally Cook-Deegan, supra note 12.
22. See McKusick, supra note 21, at 18.
23. See id. at 20-26; see also William A. Haseltine, Discovering Genes for New
Medicines, Sci. Am., Mar. 1997, at 92 (explaining how partial cDNA sequencing can
yield advances against genetically related diseases).
24. Lee, supra note 13, at 15.
25. McKusick, supra note 21, at 18. The Genome Project is an international effort
that began in 1990 to locate all of the human genes and make them available for
further research, and to sequence all three billion DNA base pairs that make up the
human genome. Human Genome Project: Frequently Asked Questions (visited Nov.
2, 1997) <http'//www.ornl.gov/TechResourcestHuman-Genomefaq/faqsl.html>. The
Genome Project consists of the Department of Energy Human Genome Program di-
rected by Axi Patrinos and the National Institute of Health National Human Genome
Research Institute directed by Francis Collins. Id. For more information about the
Genome Project, see Human Genone Project Information (visited Nov. 2, 1997)
<http'J/www.ornl.gov/TechResourcesfHumanGenomelhome.html>. For a collection
of essays about the scientific, ethical, and legal issues engendered by the Genome
Project and other genetic research, see The Code of Codes (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy
1997]
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The proposed Human Genome Diversity Project ("Diversity Pro-
ject" or "Project" or "HGDP") is a controversial spin-off of the Gen-
ome Project that intends to collect genetic samples of indigenous
populations all over the globe.2 6 Instead of mapping the entire human
genome like the Genome Project, the Diversity Project plans to amass
''a representative sample of human genetic variation" to be analyzed
under a set of standard markers.27 The resulting database would be
made available to researchers. 28 To reach these goals, the Diversity
Project plans to collect DNA from at least 500 indigenous groups
throughout the world.29 The Diversity Project explains its focus on
indigenous people as an attempt to correct "the current bias in re-
search in human genetics toward people of European descent."3 Pro-
ject participants believe that the study of genetic diversity will
enhance understanding of evolution,31 advance medicine,32 and con-
Hood eds., 1992), and Genetics & Society (Penelope Barker ed., 1995), and Alastair
T. lies, The Human Genome Project: A Challenge to the Human Rights Framework, 9
Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 27 (1996) (discussing the benefits and inadequacies of applying the
human rights approach to the issues raised by the Genome Project). Congress has
responded to the public's ethical concerns by introducing the Genetic Privacy and
Nondiscrimination Act of 1997, H.R. 2198, 105th Cong. (1997), and the Genetic Con-
fidentiality and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997, S. 422, 105th Cong. (1997).
26. The proposed project is comprised of geneticists and is run by an executive
committee and regional committees for North America, China, and Europe. Henry T.
Greely, The Control of Genetic Research: Involving the "Groups Between," 33 Hous.
L. Rev. 1397, 1415 (1997). The international geneticist Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza was
vital in the creation of the Diversity Project and served as chair of the Executive
Committee when it was formed in 1991. See Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza & Francesco
Cavalli-Sforza, The Great Human Diasporas: The History of Diversity and Evolution
258-59 (Sarah Thorne trans., 1995) [hereinafter Human Diasporas]; Cavalli-Sforza et
al., supra note 6. Henry T. Greely is the chair of the North American Regional Com-
mittee's ethics subcommittee. Greely, supra, at 1397 n.*. An independent panel con-
vened by the National Research Council has recently recommended that the Diversity
Project receive government funding provided that it improves protection for the re-
search subjects. See Moratorium Sought on DNA Sampling, Patriot Ledger, Oct. 23,
1997, available in 1997 WL 8196665 [hereinafter Moratorium Sought on DNA Sam-
pling]; Panel Endorses Global Gene Survey, United Press Int'l, Oct. 21, 1997, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. For more information about the Diversity Pro-
ject, see Human Genome Diversity Project (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http:www-le-
land.stanford.edu/group/morrinst/HGDP.html>.
27. Greely, supra note 26, at 1414-15. The organization's stated goals are to "col-
lect, preserve, analyze, and make available genetic and ethnographic information."
Proposed Model Ethical Protocol for Collecting DNA Samples, 33 Hous. L. Rev. 1431,
1433 (1997) (hereinafter Model Protocol].
28. Greely, supra note 26, at 1414.
29. Id.
30. Model Protocol, supra note 27, at 1433.
31. Greely, supra note 26, at 1414.
32. Id. at 1414-15 ("[G]reater knowledge of human genetic diversity will improve
medicine, both because it will advance the study of those genetic diseases found
largely in non-European populations, and because genetic variation is basic to better
understanding a host of diseases found in all peoples.").
(Vol. 66
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tribute to knowledge of prehistoric human migrations and
expansions.33
Project representatives have stated that no sampling of indigenous
people has been done in connection with the Diversity Project.- The
North American Regional Committee of the proposed Diversity Pro-
ject has recently published the Model Ethical Protocol for Collecting
DNA Samples ("Model Protocol").35 The guidelines are extensive
and include discussions on mandatory informed group and individual
consent,36 benefits for participating communities,37 privacy,- and pat-
enting.39 The Diversity Project requires that any researchers associ-
ated with the Project adhere to these research requirements.4" The
Diversity Project has taken a strong stand by deciding not to endorse,
support, or fund researchers that violate the Model Protocol.41
Despite the Project's efforts to allay fears and rebut accusations of
exploitation, many indigenous groups have spoken out strongly
against it.4" The Diversity Project is not, however, the only group in-
33. Model Protocol, supra note 27, at 1433 ("The HGDP expects that its work will
lead to advances in understanding the biological development and the history of our
species and, ultimately, in understanding and treating many diseases with genetic
components.").
34. Greely, supra note 26, at 1415 ("Currently. DNA collection is not yet taking
place as a formal part of the HGDP."). Diversity Project chairperson, Luigi Luca
Cavalli-Sforza, however, was involved in a pilot project of collecting indigenous DNA
samples that began in 1984. Human Diasporas, supra note 26, at 256-59: see also L
Luca Cavalli-Sforza et al., The History and Geography of Human Genes (1994) (com-
piling and analyzing genetic data of indigenous peoples from all over the world).
35. See Model Protocol, supra note 27; infra Part III.B.3.
36. Model Protocol, supra note 27, at 1441-52.
37. Id. at 1452-56.
38. Id. at 1461-64.
39. Id. at 1466-69.
40. Id at 1466-67. The Model Protocol states that the Diversity Project aims to
protect the interests of the indigenous peoples by contract. Id. at 1468. This approach,
however, does not provide adequate protection because there could be no effective
enforcement against parties who obtain samples outside of a contractual relationship.
See Greely, supra note 26, at 1419-20.
41. Model Protocol, supra note 27, at 1435-36. The Diversity Project has officially
rejected the "bleed and run" collecting done by researchers who surface to take sam-
ples and then leave without a trace. Id. at 1438.
42. Indigenous peoples have objected strenuously to the Diversity Project. Sev-
eral indigenous representatives have called on the international community for an end
to the Diversity Project. See Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Report of the
Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Fourteenth Session, Commission on
Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 14, at 27-28, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/199621
(Aug. 16, 1996). The Beijing Declaration of Indigenous Women states: -We demand
that the Human Genome Diversity Project be condemned and stopped." Beijing Dec-
laration of Indigenous Women, NGO Forum, United Nations Fourth World Confer-
ence on Women, Huairou, Beijing, Peoples Republic of China, Aug. 30-Sept. 8, 1995
(visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http:/wvwwv.web.net/-csc/textIBeijing.htm> [hereinafter Beijing
Declaration]. A regional meeting in Malaysia of indigenous peoples produced a state-
ment that "[t]he indigenous peoples of Asia strongly condemn the patenting and com-
mercialization of their cell lines or body parts, as being promoted by the scientists and
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terested in studying indigenous genome. While the Diversity Project
is exploring how to gain access to indigenous people's genetic material
by developing ethical guidelines, other researchers have already ob-
tained samples.43
The question remains of how to enforce safeguards for indigenous
peoples like those advanced in the Model Protocol.44 The federal gov-
ernment provides indirect control of research by requiring compliance
with regulations to receive federal funding.45 There is also some indi-
rect control of entities that do not receive federal funding because the
Federal Drug Administration ("FDA") requires compliance with reg-
ulations and Institutional Review Board ("IRB") research approval
before an application for FDA approval will be granted.46 Although
institutions behind the Human Genome Diversity Project." Regional Meeting of In-
digenous Peoples' Representatives on the Conservation and Protection of Indigenous
Peoples' Knowledge Systems, TVRC Tambunan, Sabah, Malaysia, Feb. 24-27, 1995
(visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://www.web.net/-csc/text/Sabah.htm> [hereinafter Sabah
Statement]. A group of indigenous peoples from the western hemisphere also de-
clared that they "particularly oppose the Human Genome Diversity Project which
intends to collect, and make available our genetic materials which may be used for
commercial, scientific and military purposes." Declaration of Indigenous Peoples of
the Western Hemisphere Regarding the Human Genome Diversity Project, Phoenix,
Arizona, Feb. 19, 1995 (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://www.indians.org/welker/gen-
ome.htm> [hereinafter Phoenix Declaration]. The Canada-based World Council of
Indigenous People stated that they "categorically reject and condemn the Human
Genome Diversity Project." Charles J. Hanley, Indigenous Peoples Resist Worldwide
Gene Study, L.A. Times, July 7, 1996, at A8.
Rural Advancement Foundation International ("RAFI") is an Ottawa-based inter-
national non-governmental organization "dedicated to the conservation and sustaina-
ble improvement of agricultural biodiversity, and to the socially responsible
development of technologies useful to rural societies." The Rural Advancement Foun-
dation International (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://www.rafi.ca/>. RAFI's Research
Director, Hope Shand, has argued that "[nJo matter how well intentioned" the Diver-
sity Project, it should not proceed until there are adequate safeguards in place. Indige-
nous People and NGOs Testify Before the National Academy of Sciences Committee
on the Human Genome Diversity Project (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://www.rafi.ca/pp/
hgdpcomm.html> [hereinafter Indigenous People Testify].
43. See infra Part I.D; see also Salopek, supra note 3 (describing genetic studies
involving indigenous peoples). The President of Organizacion Nacional Indigena de
Colombia ("ONIC"), Abadio G. Stocel, has spoken of "the large scale collection of
indigenous peoples' blood and tissues in Colombia and how some researchers had
taken advantage of the good faith of indigenous people. He explained how indige-
nous people were ill-informed about research being done on their cells." Indigenous
People Testify, supra note 42.
44. See also National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Bi-
omedical and Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and
Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research (1978) (identifying
guiding principles of research as the boundary between practice and research, the
obligations to avoid harm and maximize benefit, and the fair distribution of benefits).
45. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3515(b) (1994) (denying federal funding to research
projects that do not ensure informed consent); 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(a) (1995) (mandat-
ing Institutional Review Board ("IRB") authority to review and approve or disprove
research); id. § 46.111 (requiring broad informed consent).
46. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.1 (1997) (stating that the regulations that follow govern
FDA approval applications and investigations).
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these approaches may provide some incentive for researchers to ob-
tain the informed consent of individual subjects, these approaches are
inadequate because they do not address the issue of group consent
that exists when involving indigenous peoples. Also, although federal
regulations provide IRBs with the authority to conduct continuing re-
view of research policies and to observe the consent process and re-
search, the possibility of meaningful oversight of the collection of
indigenous genetic samples done in remote parts of the globe is highly
questionable.47 None of the current regulations can ensure the pro-
tection of indigenous peoples.
B. Life Patents
Currently, a controversy rages over the patenting of genetic infor-
mation.' The driving rationale behind the patent system is to create
an incentive for creation.49 Research and development in the genetics
field is time-consuming, expensive, and often without any monetary
payoff. The limited patent monopoly rewards the creator by building
a shield against competition. If no such protections existed, some ar-
gue that research would not take place and that all research develop-
ment would be kept a secret, thereby inhibiting others from building
47. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(e) (1996).
48. See, eg., Ned Hettinger, Patenting Life: Biotechnology, Intellectual Property,
and Environmental Ethics, 22 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 267 (1995) (questioning the
appropriateness of life patents based on their costs and risks as well as a respect for
life, and arguing that biopatents are not justified, but should be abolished); Kate H.
Murashige, Patent Protection for Biotechnology, 382 PLI/Pat. 473 (1994) (recognizing
that protection for biotechnology and sustainable development must coincide); Amy
E. Carroll, Comment, Not Always the Best Medicine: Biotechnology and the Global
Impact of U.S. Patent Law, 44 Am. U. L. Rev. 2433 (1995) (identifying a divergence of
the goals of the biotechnology industry and the patent law, which may impede bi-
otechnological progress); Barbara Looney, Note, Should Genes Be Patented? The
Gene Patenting Controversy: Legal Ethical, and Policy Foundations of an Interna-
tional Agreement, 26 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 231 (1994) (recognizing both the impor-
tant benefits of the patent system and the ethical issues raised by gene patents, then
proposing a solution that involves the creation of an international body that would
hold the human genome in trust). Moreover, controversy over patenting was one
reason why James Watson left his position as director of the National Institute of
Health. Cook-Deegan, supra note 12, at 185; Hilary Stout, Watson Resigns as Head of
U.S. Gene-Mapping Project, Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 1992, at B9.
49. According to the U.S. Patent Act, the criteria for a patent are novelty, 35
U.S.C. § 102 (1994), nonobviousness, id. § 103, and utility, id. § 101. Once a patent is
granted, the grantee has the exclusive right to make, use, or sell the invention in the
United States for twenty years from the date the patent is issued. Id. § 154(a)(2). In
exchange for the limited monopoly, the inventor must make public the advance so
that others may build on it once the patent expires or through licensing. See id. § 112.
Thus, patent law serves to reward inventiveness by protecting the commercial pros-
pects of an industrious creator, but also encourages the advancement of technology by
making the patented material available for others. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent
Rights in the Human Genome Project, in Gene Mapping, supra note 21, at 226, 227.
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on past work. ° Proponents state that patenting genetic material is
not unethical because "[p]atents on molecules derived from knowl-
edge of the human genome are already in existence and they do not
differ fundamentally from many other chemical patents on human
health care products."'" In the midst of this debate, the United States
has granted, and the Supreme Court has upheld, life patents.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided its first case about the patenting
of life in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.52 The Court held that live, human-
made microorganisms were patentable subject matter. 3 The United
States has continued to expand the definition of what is patentable
based on this decision.54 For example, patents are now granted for
DNA sequences of proteins and predisposition to disease.5  The
United States has also issued patents on cell lines derived from
humans.56
When asked who owned the polio vaccine, Jonas Salk responded:
"[T]he people, I would say. There is no patent. Could you patent the
sun?"57 The famous scientist's question implies that some things are
fundamental and should not be subject to a limited patent monop-
oly. 8 Congress has proposed legislation to implement a moratorium
on the patenting of genetically engineered animal life forms until a full
study of the resulting ethical and moral issues could be completed. 9
A moratorium has never taken place, however, and life patenting con-
50. See Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Finding a Balance:
Computer Software, Intellectual Property and the Challenge of Technological Change
185 (1992).
51. N.H. Carey & P.E. Crawley, Commercial Exploitation of the Human Genome:
What are the Problems?, in Ciba Foundation, Human Genetic Information: Science,
Law and Ethics 133, 137 (1990).
52. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
53. Id.
54. See Biotechnological Process Patents Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-41, § 1, 109
Stat. 351, 351 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 103(b)(3) (Supp. 1997)) (listing several bi-
otechnological processes that may be patented). For an analysis of patent law, life
patents, and the Federal Circuit, see Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Biotechnology and the
Federal Circuit (1995).
55. See Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 228 n.16 (citing as examples, U.S. Patent
4,994,371 (Feb. 19, 1991) (sequence of human factor IX) and U.S. Patent 4,970,161
(Nov. 13, 1990) (incorporation of human-interferon gamma sequence)).
56. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991); see also Richard Gold, Owning Our Bodies: An Exami-
nation of Property Law and Biotechnology, 32 San Diego L. Rev. 1167, 1169 (1995)
(noting that many biotechnology products are based on the human body).
57. George Johnson, Once Again, A Man with a Mission, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25,
1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 57, 61 (noting, however, that in fact there was nothing to
patent and that National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis researchers were not enti-
tled to receive royalties anyway).
58. Similarly, Leonor Zalabata Torres, an Arhuaco leader from the Sierra Nevada
de Santa Marta, Colombia, has expressed that for her and her people: "Some things
just aren't for sale." Indigenous People Testify, supra note 42.
59. See, e.g., Life Patenting Moratorium Act of 1993, S. 387, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2(1) (1993) (suggesting a two-year moratorium on several types of life patents).
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tinues in the United States to this day. In 1995, the European Parlia-
ment voted to reject a directive that would have explicitly allowed the
patenting of life forms.60 Although the decision did not have much of
an immediate impact because patents in Europe are granted by the
European Patent Office, a non-European Union body, and member
nations' individual patent offices, biotechnology companies continued
to lobby for passage of the directive.6 1 Their efforts were successful
when, in July 1997, the European Parliament approved an almost
identical directive that must now be approved by both the European
Union executive office and member states' governments. 2 As dis-
cussed in the next section, these patents have engendered a contro-
versy in the context of the genetic research of indigenous peoples.
C. Scope of the Problem
Many indigenous groups do not believe that outsiders should take
samples and conduct research on their genetic material.63 They feel
that it is molecular colonialism and fear that indigenous peoples will
be harvested for genetic samples with no compensation.' Some raise
concerns about whether indigenous peoples are capable of giving their
informed consent because they lack the sophistication to understand
genetic research. 65 Genetic patenting is antithetical to some indige-
60. Nigel Hawkes, Euro MPs Turn Down Life-Forms Patent Law, Times
(London), Mar. 2, 1995, available in 1995 WL 7652787; see also Ethics and Human
Genetics, Proceedings 2nd Symposium of the Council of Europe on Bioethics, Stras-
bourg, Nov. 30-Dec. 2, 1993, at 95-114 (discussing the proposed directive and whether
the human genome should be patentable).
61. Id.; Alan Simpson, The Theft of Our Souls, Guardian, July 11, 1997, at 19.
62. Europe Gives Green Light to Gene Law, Independent, July 17, 1997, at 2; see
Simpson, supra note 61, at 19.
63. See, e.g., Phoenix Declaration, supra note 42 ("We demand an immediate mor-
atorium on collections and/or patenting of genetic materials from indigenous persons
and communities by any scientific project, health organization[,] governments,
[i]ndependent agencies, or individual researchers.").
64. See, e.g., Sabah Statement, supra note 42 (stating that patenting indigenous ge-
netic material "is akin to robbing indigenous peoples of their resources and knowl-
edge through monopoly rights"); Beijing Declaration, supra note 42 ("Bioprospecting,
which is nothing but the alienation of our invaluable intellectual and cultural heritage
through scientific collection missions and ethnobotanical research, is another feature
of recolonization.").
65. See, e.g., Sabah Statement, supra note 42 ("The technological method of piracy
is too sophisticated for indigenous peoples to understand, especially when indigenous
communities are unaware of how the system operates and who are behind it.").
Debra Harry, a Pauite Indian, thinks it is "impossible for scientists to give indigenous
populations informed information, to explain what they are doing with this DNA."
Leslie Alan Horvitz, 'Vampire Project' Raises Issue of Patents for Human Genes, In-
sight Mag., July 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11224474. This opinion may underesti-
mate human capabilities. First world nations have been taking advantage of
indigenous peoples for centuries, but categorical denial of their capacity may unjustly
limit them. The process by which to achieve informed consent, however, is much
more involved than -with members of an industrial state. One major hurdle is lan-
guage, and another is lack of exposure to scientific ideas. Many indigenous groups
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nous belief systems. 66 Although diagnostic tools or cures may be dis-
covered, many indigenous populations may never benefit because
they live so far away from medical centers.67 Others opposed to this
research express concern about the purpose of the genetic databases
and fear that the information could be used to harm indigenous peo-
ples. 68 Some believe that the millions of dollars spent to do the re-
simply will not have the language of genetics or western science. This obstacle, how-
ever, is not insurmountable.
For discussions about informed consent, human rights, and regulating human ex-
perimentation, see Jesse A. Goldner, An Overview of Legal Controls on Human Ex-
perimentation and the Regulatory Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38
St. Louis U. L.J. 63 (1993), and Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights,
38 St. Louis U. L.J. 7 (1993).
66. As illustrated by the Guaymi example, infra notes 75-83 and accompanying
text, some indigenous groups believe that it is against nature to patent human genetic
information, and some think it is wrong to patent any life genetic information. See,
e.g., Beijing Statement, supra note 42 ("We call for a stop to the patenting of all life
forms. This to us, is the ultimate commodification of life which we hold sacred.");
Sabah Statement, supra note 42 ("For indigenous peoples, life is a common property
which cannot be owned, commercialized and monopolized by individuals."). Group
TWo in the hypothetical is also concerned with this issue.
Indigenous groups have a wide variety of religious or spiritual beliefs. As with
many aspects of indigenous culture, the range is so vast as to defy sweeping general-
izations. There are, however, some discernible trends that center around respect for
nature, land, and life. Indigenous life has been reliant on and sustained by nature in a
direct way, such that native groups tend to view nature and the naturally occurring
world as sacred. For example, the 1995 Summary of the Issues Affecting Indigenous
Women: Fourth World Conference on Women stated:
To Indigenous Peoples, our spiritual ties to Mother Earth and respect for all
living creatures are ... a way of life. Our survival is dependent upon our
inherent right to practice our traditional ways and teachings which have
been given to us by the Creator.... To us, the Earth and everything upon it
is sacred.
Summary of the Issues Affecting Indigenous Women: Fourth World Conference on
Women, Beijing, China (Sept. 4-15, 1995) [hereinafter Fourth World Conference]. The
Phoenix Declaration provides another example:
Our principles are based upon our profound belief in the sacredness of all
Creation, both animate and inanimate. We live in a reciprocal relationship
with all life in this divine and natural order.
We hold precious all life in its natural form. The harmonious progress of the
natural order in the environment shapes and defines healthy genetic
diversity.
The principle of harmony requires that we do not violate the principles of
Creation by manipulating and changing the natural order.
Phoenix Declaration, supra note 42.
67. Anthropologist Jonathan Friedlaender, of Temple University, recognizes that
tribes "aren't going to benefit from any new drugs out of this stuff because the medi-
cal care system there is primitive." Teresa Riordan, A Recent Patent on a Papua New
Guinea Tribe's Cell Line Prompts Outrage and Charges of Biopiracy, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 27, 1995, at D2.
68. See Kathy Holliman, Gene Research Probes Indian Alcoholism, Bangor Daily
News, June 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10701920.
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search should go to help save indigenous people from more
immediate threats such as malaria and starvation."
Genetic researchers believe that much of the criticism aimed at
them is because their work is "easily misunderstood and
demagogued."7 ° In fact, not all indigenous people are against genetic
research and patenting. Some indigenous people are interested in
learning more about their migratory history.7 Other indigenous
groups suffer from diseases and want to participate in this research,
hoping to facilitate the development of a cure that will benefit them.-
As discussed above, the ethical guidelines created by the Diversity
Project require that researchers obtain the informed consent of indig-
enous people before collecting samples.73 The guidelines also discuss
the difficult questions relating to adequate compensation for indige-
nous groups for their participation.74 Problems arise when, as in the
introductory hypothetical, people are not fully informed or are not
adequately compensated. As discussed below, there are no laws that
explicitly address the hypothetical cases. Human rights principles,
however, should provide redress for indigenous peoples confronted
with this situation.
D. Recent Incidents with Indigenous Groups
An increasing number of incidents involving indigenous sampling
and patenting exemplify the issues that arise at the nexus of indige-
69. See Horvitz, supra note 65; see also Phoenix Declaration, supra note 42 ("We
demand that scientific endeavors and resources be prioritized to support and improve
social, economic and environmental conditions of indigenous peoples in their environ-
ments, thereby improving health conditions and raising the overall quality of life.");
Indigenous People Testify, supra note 42 (quoting Ruth Liloqula, Director of the Agri-
cultural Research of the Government of the Solomon Islands. who testified in per-
sonal capacity, that the Diversity Project's research agenda was not in line with her
country's priorities and that they were more concerned with diseases like malaria, not
on historical migrations, and stated: "We know who we are.").
70. Sally Lehrman, NIH Forfeits Rights to Patent on Papua New Guinea Cell Line,
Biotechnology Newswatch, Jan. 6, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8790236 (quoting Hank
Greely, chair of the Diversity Project's ethics subcommittee and Stanford University
professor of law).
71. Doug George from the Iroquois Confederacy in Central New York noted that
the genetic information may help tribes interested in their migratory history by con-
firming ancient stories. Holliman, supra note 68.
72. One example of an indigenous group that is pleased with their involvement in
genetic research is the Sandy Lake Band from Northern Ontario who have an agree-
ment with the Samuel Lunenfeld Research Institute at Toronto's Mount Sinai Hospi-
tal. Band Reaches Deal in Diabetes Study, Vancouver Sun, Mar. 30, 1996, at A4.
Researchers hope that, with the help of the groups' blood, they may be able to de-
velop a cure for diabetes. Id. Data becomes the property of the band and the band
gets veto power as to what happens to their genetic material and 20% of any profits.
Id. The band's Chief Eli Sawanas is quoted as saying, "We knew what we wanted
from the research .... We've been involved from the beginning. There hasn't been
any part of the research we haven't been aware of." Id.
73. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
74. Model Protocol, supra note 27, at 1452-56, 1466-68.
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nous peoples and genetic research. Some scientists and patenting na-
tions have ignored the possibility that indigenous peoples' belief
systems may be incompatible with industrialized intellectual property
systems.75 One situation involved the Guaymi, an indigenous group
inhabiting Panama. In the early 1990s, the U.S. Department of Com-
merce submitted a patent application on the cell line of a Guaymi
woman.76 The cell line was believed to have anti-viral qualities.77 Ru-
ral Advancement Foundation International ("RAFI") 78 found the ap-
plication while going through a database of patent applications and
contacted the Guaymi people.79 Neither the tribe nor the woman
knew anything about the development of the cell line or the patent
application.80 Rural Advancement and other groups supported the
Guaymi in their demand for withdrawal of the patent application.8
The Guaymi tribal president explained, "[i]t's fundamentally immoral,
contrary to the Guaymi view of nature, and our place in it. To patent
human material ... to take human DNA and patent its products...
violates the integrity of life itself, and our deepest sense of moral-
ity."82 Later that year, due to international pressure, the Center for
Disease Control withdrew the patent application.83
Another concern is that emerging policy is currently defined by gov-
ernment departments and agencies, as was evidenced by the response
of the U.S. Department of Commerce when the people of the Solo-
mon Islands were the subject of a cell line patent application.84 When
their government became aware of the application, its United Nations
ambassador wrote a letter of protest to the U.S. Department of Com-
merce.85 Former Department Secretary Ron Brown stated in re-
sponse: "Under our laws, as well as those of many other countries,
subject matter relating to human cells is patentable and there is no
75. See, e.g., Sabah Statement, supra note 42 ("Based on this worldview, indige-
nous peoples find it difficult to relate intellectual property rights issues to their daily
lives. Accordingly, the patenting of any life forms and processes is unacceptable to
indigenous peoples.").
76. Philip L. Bereano, Patent Pending: The Race to Own DNA, Seattle Times,
Aug. 27, 1995, at B5.
77. Id.
78. For a description of the organization, see supra note 42.
79. Bereano, supra note 76, at B5.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Letter from Ambassador Rex Horoi to the U.S. Department of Commerce
(Feb. 1, 1994) (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://www.rafi.ca/pp/hotobr.html>; see Bere-
ano, supra note 76, at B5.
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provision for considerations relating to the source of the cells that may
be the subject of a patent application."'"
Furthermore, in the absence of stringent international guidelines
governing genetic research, it is often unclear whether indigenous co-
operation is really exploitive. One example involved the Hagahai, a
tribe from the Madang Province of Papua New Guinea. The tribe,
described as a 260-member group of hunter-horticulturists, did not
have any contact with outsiders until 1984 when some tribe members
sought outside help for illness that plagued the group.' During the
course of attempting to discover how to help the Hagahai people, re-
searchers discovered that several members of the tribe were infected
with the human T-cell leukemia virus ("HTLV-I") that usually pro-
duces severe leukemia, but is benign in the Hagahai. Scientists cre-
ated an HTLV-infected cell line of Hagahai DNA that was thought
may be valuable in developing a diagnostic tool or vaccine.' The cell
line was patented and researchers were listed as the "inventors. '-9°
The patent quickly became the focus of international attention.9"
The Papua New Guinea government questioned whether the patent
claim violated that nation's sovereignty.92 Non-governmental organi-
zations claimed that the incident was another example of biodiversity
prospecting-or "biopiracy.19 3 Researchers claimed to have discussed
the idea of the patent with the tribe and asserted that the tribe had a
clear understanding of the concept of ownership,' and that the re-
86. Letter from former Department of Commerce Secretary Ron Brown to Solo-
mon Islands United Nations Ambassador Rex Horoi (Mar. 3, 1994) (visited Nov. 2,
1997) <http:/hvww.rafi.ca/pp/brtoho.html>; see Bereano, supra note 76, at B5.
87. See Gary Taubes, Scientists Attacked for 'Patenting' Pacific Tribe, Science, Nov.
17, 1995, at 1112.
88. Riordan, supra note 67. With the New Guinea Institute of Medical Research
("IMR"), health workers collected blood samples from the tribe and sent them to the
gene bank at the U.S. National Institute of Health ("NIH"). See Taubes, supra note
87.
89. Nigel Hawkes, Tribal Treasure, Times (London), Mar. 4. 1996, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Majpap File; Taubes, supra note 87.
90. On February 13, 1996, Patent No. 5,397,696 for a "Papua New Guinea human
T-lymphotropic virus" was assigned to the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. Riordan, supra note 67. NIH claimed to have patented the cell line to clarify
the rights for private companies who might want to use the cell line to develop diag-
nostic tests for HTLV-I. Taubes, supra note 87.
91. See Lehrman, supra note 70.
92. Tempest Ending for 'Cell Line:' U.S. Stepping Back from Genetic Patent, Ari-
zona Republic, Sept. 22, 1996, at A18 [hereinafter Tempest.
93. David Robie, Biotechnology-South Pacific: Tribe Caught in Blood Tug-of-War,
Inter Press Service, Oct. 25, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10135200.
94. There was apparently an agreement, the details of which are unclear, that the
people were to receive royalties that came from any commercial viability. Taubes,
supra note 87; see also Lehrman, supra note 70 ("[Sjcientists involved with the HTLV-
1 application said they felt compelled to establish some precedent to protect the
Hagahai interest in their own tissue, since Papua New Guinea has no patent laws or
other regulations governing the usage of biological materials or intellectual property
rights.").
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searchers only proceeded after securing their approval. 95 The patent
proved not to have any commercial value.96 NIH offered to transfer
the patent rights to a trust benefiting the remote tribe, but biotech
companies showed no interest in buying it. 97 The researchers opposed
a patent transfer to the tribe claiming that it was too expensive and,
instead, decided to abandon the patent.9 On October 24, 1996, NIH
forfeited its rights to the patent at the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office ("PTO"). 99
These examples show the problems that result from indigenous ge-
netic research. Researchers and nations that grant patents may disre-
gard indigenous beliefs fundamentally incompatible with such grants.
Government agencies and departments can easily dismiss indigenous
complaints. With no clear guidelines firmly in place, it is difficult to
determine whether indigenous people were taken advantage of or
whether they participated in research after giving fully informed
consent.
PART II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Neither domestic nor international law explicitly provide a remedy
for indigenous peoples whose genetic material has been collected or
used against their wishes. This part outlines the present inadequacies
of domestic and international law.
A. Domestic Common Law is Currently Inadequate
Neither Congress nor U.S. courts have directly addressed the rights
of indigenous people in connection with genetic sampling and patent-
ing. One case, however, looms large in the area of genetic research,
and has spawned much debate about body part ownership."° In
95. Taubes, supra note 87. The Papua New Guinea government almost deported
one researcher involved, but subsequently exonerated her from wrongdoing, deter-
mining that she had obtained the full consent of the tribe. Lehrman, supra note 70.
96. Riordan, supra note 67 (citing Greely).
97. Tempest, supra note 92, at A18.
98. Id.; Lehrman, supra note 70.
99. Lehrman, supra note 70 (citing to the notice of the patent disclaimer that was
published December 10, 1996 in the PTO's Official Gazette).
100. See, e.g., Joseph M. Healey, Jr. & Kara L. Dowling, Controlling Conflicts of
Interest in the Doctor-Patient Relationship: Lessons from Moore v. Regents of the
University of California, 42 Mercer L. Rev. 989 (1991) (examining Moore, the doctor-
patient relationship as a fiduciary duty, and conflicts of interest); Catherine Caturano
Horan, Note, Your Spleen is Not Worth What It Used to Be: Moore v. Regents of
UCLA, 24 Creighton L. Rev. 1423 (1991) (arguing that the informed consent require-
ment raises the possibility that a patient's decision-making will be confused, and that
the court's decision to deny Moore recognition of property rights creates inequities in
research); Stephen Ashley Mortinger, Comment, Spleen for Sale: Moore v. Regents
of the University of California and the Right to Sell Parts of Your Body, 51 Ohio St.
L.J. 499 (1990) (arguing that the California Court of Appeals, which was later re-
versed by the California Supreme Court, correctly held that Moore had a protectable
property interest in his excised cells).
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Moore v. Regents of the University of California,'0' the California
Supreme Court addressed the protocol and rights surrounding genetic
sampling, research, and patenting of a cell line derived from a U.S.
citizen's cells. The court was faced with the decision of whether to
recognize a cause of action for the unauthorized use of a patient's cells
for commercial gain. °2
John Moore was diagnosed with hairy-cell leukemia, a rare form of
cancer. 0 3 During treatment, his physician withdrew excess samples of
blood and performed a splenectomy without informing Moore that his
spleen and blood samples were going to be used in research."' The
physician and researchers developed a cell line from those samples.' 5
The cell line proved lucrative, and Moore sued the physician and re-
searchers on several grounds, including breach of fiduciary duty and
conversion. He argued that his physician and the researchers
breached their fiduciary duty by failing to inform him that they were
taking excess samples and of their economic interest in the re-
search.10 6 Moore also argued that he had a property interest in his
excised cells and, thus, that the defendants' unauthorized actions con-
stituted a conversion.1 7
The court ruled that Moore had a right to be fully informed by his
physician-that Moore could maintain a cause of action alleging that
the doctor breached his fiduciary duty to inform Moore of the re-
search.'08 Moore could not, however, maintain a cause of action
against the researchers because the court held that the researchers
owed no fiduciary duty to Moore.10 9 Moreover, the court decided that
Moore was not entitled to property rights in his excised cells."t 0 This
101. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
102. Id. at 480.
103. Id. at 480-81.
104. Id. at 481 (including in the list of excess biological material obtained by the
doctor: blood serum, skin, bone marrow aspirate, and sperm).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 483, 486; see infra Part II.A.1.
107. Moore, 793 P.2d at 487; see infra Part II.A.2.
108. Moore, 793 P.2d at 486. For a discussion of fiduciary duty, see infra Part
II.A.1.
109. Moore, 793 P.2d at 486.
110. Id. at 497. There are many ethical issues involved in the treatment of genetic
material as property. See Richard Gold, Owning Our Bodies: An Eramination of
Property Law and Biotednology, 32 San Diego L. Rev. 1167 (1995) (suggesting that
recognizing property rights in genetic material would inappropriately focus on the
market aspects of the body and health); Peter Halewood, Law's Bodies: Disembodi-
ment and the Structure of Liberal Property Rights, 81 Iowa L Rev. 1331 (1996) (argu-
ing that a relational property theory-in which the context and appropriate interests
drive the decision in disputes where biotechnology commodifies the body-should
replace conventional liberal and market-inalienability property theories); Judith B.
Prowda, Moore v. The Regents of the University of California: An Ethical Debate on
Informed Consent and Property Rights in a Patient's Cells, 77 J. Pat. & Trademark Off.
Soe'y 611, 629-32 (1995) (questioning the validity of the Moore court's reasoning and
conversion holding); Sharon N. Perley, Note, From Control Over One's Body to Con-
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part examines why the Moore decision falls short of adequately pro-
tecting indigenous peoples, but concludes that the decision does not
preclude enhanced protection for indigenous peoples.
1. Fiduciary Duty and Informed Consent
The Moore court ruled that Moore's doctor owed him a fiduciary
duty. A fiduciary duty is a duty to act in another's interest at the
expense of one's personal interest."' A fiduciary relationship arises
between parties when one side must rely on and trust the other, who is
in a position of power or domination."' If a court decides that a fidu-
ciary relationship is so important as to create a fiduciary duty, a
breach of that duty gives rise to a tort."13
The doctrine of informed consent stems from a doctor's duty to a
patient and recognizes the patient's right to self-determination and au-
tonomy.' 14 It encompasses the general principle that, for a patient to
trol Over One's Body Parts: Extending the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 67 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 335 (1992) (arguing that the informed consent doctrine should be expanded to
protect a patient's dignitary interest in excised cells); Catherine M. Valerio Barrad,
Comment, Genetic Information and Property Theory, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1037, 1085-86
(1993) (stating that when evaluating the unmeasurable competing interests of a per-
son whose genetic material has been used by a researcher, a court should resist the
temptation to be swayed by the inevitable bias to decide based on a utilitarian influ-
ence to benefit the larger group of people and societal interests).
111. Black's Law Dictionary 625 (6th ed. 1990). The Moore court recognized that a
fiduciary duty could be viewed as a broad concept. Indeed, the court indicated that
the term "fiduciary" was, in some ways, too broad because the doctor was not respon-
sible to protect the patient's financial interests as the term implied. Rather, the court
ruled that there was a duty "because certain personal interests may affect professional
judgment." Moore, 793 P.2d at 485 n.10.
112. Black's Law Dictionary 626 (6th ed. 1990). Some common examples of this
relationship that give rise to a legal duty are between attorney and client, see Restate-
ment (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 28 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, Mar.
29, 1996), and principal and agent, see Restatement (Second) of Agency § 13, cmt. a
(1958).
113. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 reporters' note (1982); W. Page Kee-
ton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 53, at 356-59 (5th ed. 1984).
114. The Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health ac-
knowledged that the doctrine of informed consent had become firmly entrenched in
American tort law. 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990). The Court referred to one of its prior
decisions which "observed that '[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law."' Id. (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bot-
sford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)); see Schloendorff v. Society of the N.Y. Hosp., 211
N.Y. 125, 129-30 (1914) (Cardozo, J.) ("Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient's consent, commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages."); Katz, supra note 65, at 9 ("The requirements of
consent and informed consent, based on principles of autonomy and self-determina-
tion, became central prescriptions for the protection of subjects of research." (cita-
tions omitted)); see also Keeton, supra note 113, § 32, at 190 ("The informed consent
doctrine is based on principles of individual autonomy, and specifically on the premise
that every person has the right to determine what shall be done to his own body.").
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make an educated decision about whether to agree to treatment, the
doctor must explain information that would be material to the deci-
sion." 5 A patient claiming that a doctor failed to obtain informed
consent must prove that the undisclosed information was material and
that there was a causal link between the nondisclosure and the
harm."16
The Moore court ruled that a physician could breach a fiduciary
duty to a patient by failing to obtain the patient's informed consent
prior to performing a medical procedure and, subsequently, using the
patient's biological material for research.' 17 The court acknowledged
"three well-established principles:" First, that adults have a right to
exercise control over their bodies and decide whether to submit to
medical treatment; second, that effective patient consent must be in-
formed; and third, that physicians are under a fiduciary duty to dis-
close material information." 8 The court concluded that the required
disclosure included any interest that might affect the physician's judg-
ment, even if that interest was unrelated to the patient's health.11 9
Accordingly, the court held that Moore had a cause of action
against his treating physician for breach of fiduciary duty because the
physician failed to obtain his informed consent by neglecting to dis-
close his research and economic interests in Moore's cells.120 Specifi-
cally, the physician neglected to inform Moore of his "prior formed
intent" to access Moore's rare biological material for research and
commercial purposes.' 2 ' According to the Moore court, however, no
recovery was available against the researchers because there was no
contact between the researcher defendants and Moore. 12
Moore is of limited assistance to the indigenous people of the hypo-
thetical groups from the introduction. Under the above analysis,
plaintiffs from hypothetical Group One should be able to recover
damages from the physician because, like Moore's, their samples were
obtained in the course of medical treatment without disclosure of the
physician's research and commercial incentives. Groups Two and
115. Keeton, supra note 113, § 32, at 190-92. In the context of epidemiological
studies, a person gives informed consent if she understands the study's purpose, na-
ture, requirements, risks, and benefits. See Council for International Organizations of
Medical Science, International Guidelines for Ethical Review of Epidemiological
Studies (1991).
116. Keeton, supra note 113, at 190-92.
117. Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
118. Id.
119. Id-
120. Id. at 485, 497.
121. Id. at 485.
122. Id- at 486. The court left undecided, however, whether the researchers could
be held secondarily liable based on the doctor's non-disclosure. Id. at 486-87. The
court had disdain for Moore's "generic boilerplate" secondary-liability allegations and
noted that Moore had not alleged in his complaint that any of the researchers knew
that he had not been fully informed. Id. at 486 n.12.
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Three had direct contact with the Researchers who solicited their ge-
netic samples. These groups could attempt to convince a court that
Researchers should be held to a duty to fully inform potential subjects
with whom they have direct contact. Moore offers no direct protection
to Groups Two and Three, however, because the holding was limited
to physicians.
The informed consent route to liability is severely limited as to
Group One researchers because Group One did not have direct con-
tact with the Researchers who obtained the genetic samples through
the physician at the health clinic. The Researchers of Group One
would not be liable under Moore because they did not have the kind
of direct contact with the group that might give rise to a duty to
inform.12
3
123. Despite the Moore court's treatment of the researchers, a court could recog-
nize that researchers who did not have direct contact with an indigenous people none-
theless have a duty to ensure that they are informed about the research. A court is
free to recognize a new duty where it decides the plaintiff ought to be protected. See
Keeton, supra note 113, § 53, at 359; see also Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) ("[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, but
merely conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular type, liability should be
imposed for damage done."). The conception of legal duties change along with the
court's view of human relations and social conditions. Id. ("Changing social condi-
tions lead constantly to the recognition of new duties."); Joseph W. Glannon, The
Law of Torts 174 (1995) ("[D]uties ... are not immutable truths; they are pragmatic
policy judgments that may be reconsidered by future judges as society and public
attitudes evolve."). Courts have recognized torts based on a breach of a fiduciary
relationship in situations where the relationship is less direct than that between a
doctor and patient. See, e.g., Zimpel v. Trawick, 679 F. Supp. 1502, 1511 (W.D. Ark.
1988) (holding that defendants had a duty to disclose information to an unsophistica-
ted, seriously ill vendor where defendants had knowledge superior to that of the ven-
dor); Winkler v. Rocky Mountain Conference of the United Methodist Church, 923
P.2d 152, 157-58 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (ruling that the pastor and church had entered
into a fiduciary relationship with a parishioner who sued for breach of that duty when
the pastor allegedly touched her in an inappropriate manner), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
771 (1997). Courts consider several factors when deciding whether to recognize a
duty, including convenience of administration, foreseeability of the harm, burden on
the defendant to avert future harm, the sophistication of the parties, and moral blame.
See Keeton, supra note 113, § 54, at 359; Glannon, supra, at 173-74.
All of the factors that courts consider in deciding whether to recognize a duty sup-
port the conclusion that even researchers who do not have direct contact with an
indigenous people should be held to owe a legal duty to fully inform them about
genetic research and patenting. For one, it would not be excessively difficult to ad-
minister claims of indigenous people alleging that researchers breached a duty to fully
inform. Although something as simple as a signed consent form would not suffice to
prove full disclosure and the consent of an indigenous people as a group, a court
could determine whether the researcher's actions fulfilled the duty in a particular
case. A second factor that supports the recognition of a duty is the foreseeability of
the harm. The Moore court protected the researchers by characterizing them as hav-
ing "no reason to believe that their use of a particular cell sample is, or may be,
against a donor's wishes." Moore, 793 P.2d at 493. Researchers interested in studying
the genetic makeup of indigenous people should be aware that this type of research
may be against the wishes of the people because of the recent incidents of indigenous
people protesting the use of their genetic material. Third, recognizing a duty of re-
searchers to obtain the informed consent of indigenous peoples before including them
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2. Property Rights
In its attempt to protect researchers and the biotechnology industry,
the Moore court decided that recognition of a property right for
Moore's excised cells was inappropriate and denied Moore's tort
claim of conversion.2 4 Conversion is the unauthorized exercise of
control over goods belonging to another.'25 Such control must alter
the condition of the goods, or exclude the owner from enjoying prop-
erty rights.'2 Again, the court declined to recognize a legal duty "to
investigate the consensual pedigree of each human cell sample used in
research" on the biotechnology industry.1 27
The court concluded that existing property law did not support a
recognition of property rights in Moore's cells, and went on to decide
that conversion liability should not be extended." First, it concluded
that the policy considerations involved in protecting a patient's right
to make a competent medical decision and protecting parties engaged
in "socially useful" activities weighed in favor of avoiding any chilling
effect liability might have on the biotechnology industry.'2 9 Second,
the court believed that the legislature should determine whether to
impose liability for the scientific use of human cells because the legis-
lature was better suited to consider the complex policy issues in-
volved.130 Third, the court felt no pressing need to impose the strict
liability tort of conversion where the plaintiff could recover on an-
other theory, as the court had recognized the physician's duty to
inform.1
31
The driving force behind the court's decision was a desire to avoid a
chilling effect on the industry that would stunt the free flow of infor-
in genetic studies would not create too heavy of a burden on the researchers. Re-
searchers could adhere to informed consent procedures designed to protect indige-
nous peoples and ensure full disclosure. Genetic studies of indigenous peoples would
be on a smaller scale and easier to keep track of than a large number of samples
gathered from all over the country. Although the effort required from researchers is
not negligible, recognition of the duty would not impose an undue burden when bal-
anced against the gravity of the potential harm. The Moore court was largely con-
cerned with protecting researchers who, in the court's opinion, were "engaged in
socially useful activities." Id. A study that may be considered "socially useful" in the
United States, however, may not be considered "socially useful" to an indigenous
people. Indigenous peoples may consider such research to be socially harmful,
against nature and morality.
124. Moore, 793 P.2d at 495 (comparing its decision to not expand tort liability in
this case with a previous decision to avoid frustrating the pharmaceutical industry by
imposing strict liability (citing Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988))).
125. Black's Law Dictionary 332 (6th ed. 1990).
126. Id
127. Moore, 793 P.2d at 487.
128. Id. at 488-89, 493.
129. Id. at 493-94.
130. Id. at 493, 496.
131. Id. at 493, 496-97.
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mation due to the ubiquitous specter of litigation. 132 The Moore court
reasoned that if researchers and pharmaceutical companies, acting in
good faith, are not assured of their property right in genetically de-
rived products, the economic incentive to participate in research and
development would be destroyed.' 33 The court did not want to inhibit
access to the "[t]housands of human cell lines" that were already in
tissue repositories. 34 Thus, the Moore conversion holding offers no
protection for the three hypothetical groups. 135 Moore fails to provide
132. Id. at 494. But see Laura M. Ivey, Comment, Moore v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of California: Insufficient Protection of Patients' Rights in the Biotechnological
Market, 25 Ga. L. Rev. 489 (1991) (arguing that the court wrongly decided the conver-
sion issue, in part because it over-emphasized research protection at the expense of
patient rights).
133. Moore, 793 P.2d at 495.
134. Id. at 494.
135. The Moore court conceded, however, that it could not rule that there were no
circumstances under which excised cells could be recognized under a property theory.
Id. at 493. Even if the Moore court's premise-that the biotechnology industry would
be stunted if a property right in genetic material was recognized-is correct in cases
like Moore's, it is not a sufficient justification to tip the scales when balanced against
the unique concerns of indigenous peoples. The burden on researchers that would be
created by recognizing a property interest in indigenous peoples' excised cells and any
marketable derivative would not have the crippling effect feared by the Moore court.
The Moore court characterized the uncertainty of title as a "ticket in a litigation lot-
tery" for those researchers who did not have any control over the collection of sam-
ples, but who later obtain and use the samples in research. Id. at 495-96. Instead of
deciding not to participate in research with an indigenous people, however, research-
ers could simply require proof of the indigenous people's fully informed consent and
an agreement as to property interests to shield themselves from the liability that
would result from working with an illegally-obtained sample. These researchers are
not unable to protect themselves. Rather, they could negotiate an express warranty
that the genetic sample was free from defects, thus providing themselves with re-
course against the seller. See U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (1996) (stating that express warran-
ties by the seller are created by "[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the
seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the
bargain").
Another compelling reason to recognize indigenous peoples' property right to their
genetic material is to avoid enforcing Western property norms to the detriment of
indigenous peoples. The Western property model is inconsistent with many indige-
nous conceptions of property because it fails to acknowledge ideas of group owner-
ship and collective symbolism. See Theresa Simpson, Note, Claims of Indigenous
Peoples to Cultural Property in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, 18 Hastings Int'l
& Comp. L. Rev. 195, 196 (1994); see also Craig D. Jacoby & Charles Weiss, Recog-
nizing Property Rights in Traditional Biocultural Contribution, 16 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 74
(1997) (proposing a new property rights theory that would protect the biocultural
contributions of indigenous peoples). Indigenous people more often hold property in
common and, in some cases, cannot alienate something that holds meaning for the
group without collective assent. See, for example, a statement issued by the Coordi-
nating Body of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazon Basin ("COICA"):
For members of indigenous peoples, knowledge and determination of the
use of resources are collective and intergenerational. No indigenous popula-
tion, whether of individuals or communities, nor the government can sell or
transfer ownership of resources which are the property of the people and
which each generation has an obligation to safeguard for the next.
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full protection for indigenous peoples. The next section examines in-
ternational law in search of protection for indigenous peoples.
B. International Human Rights Law is Currently Inadequate
International human rights law is not static, but has an ever-chang-
ing and often-confusing landscape. Both positive law instruments,
such as treaties, and customary international law, are binding on na-
tions. Unfortunately, neither directly addresses indigenous peoples'
concerns about their genetic material.
Positive international law includes treaties, or other international
agreements, by which states have explicitly pledged to abide." There
is no international instrument directly addressing the sampling and
patenting of indigenous peoples' genetic material that is binding on
the United States.1 37 The United States has signed onto international
documents, however, that recognize rights relevant to indigenous peo-
ples' control over their genetic material and which may help provide
COICA Statement, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, Sept. 28-30, 1994, art. I, § 7 (vis-
ited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://users.ox.ac.uk/-wgtrr/coica.htm> [hereinafter COICA State-
ment]; cf John Moustakas, Note, Group Rights in Cultural Property: Justifying Strict
Inalienability, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 1179, 1184-85 (1989) (arguing for the strict inaliena-
bility of property that is strongly related to a group's identity, the retention of which
would not create bad object relations). To impose liability for only the breach of a
duty to fully inform would limit an indigenous peoples' recovery to damages for the
harm caused by the breach of that duty. A denial of property rights would preclude
indigenous peoples from enjoying the benefits that accompany such rights, including
the ability to enjoin use of their genetic material, or to share in the profit should a
lucrative product be developed from their genetic material.
136. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§§ 102(1)(b), 102(3), 111(1) (1987) [hereinafter Restatement (Third)]. A treaty be-
tween nations is like a contract between private parties and generally creates binding
obligations only for the parties that agree to be bound. See id. §§ 321, 102 cmt. f.
137. Although Article 15(1) of the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 I.LM. 818 (1992) (opened
for signature June 5, 1992, entered into force Dec. 29, 1993), vests control of access to
genetic resources with the national governments of the state parties to the treaty, the
United States has not yet ratified it, and the treaty cannot fairly be read to include the
human genetic material of indigenous peoples. See Greely, supra note 26. at 1405-06.
For a discussion of international instruments addressing the issue but not binding on
the United States, see infra Part III.B.1-2.
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redress for indigenous people.1 38 Self-determination is the most di-
rectly relevant of those rights.139
For example, Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights 4 ° ("ICCPR"), an international treaty covering many
human rights, proclaims that: "All peoples have the right of self-de-
termination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their polit-
ical status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development."'' The United States signed onto the treaty in 1992.142
States that have become signatories to the treaty assume the responsi-
bility of promoting the right to self-determination. 43 Its effectiveness
is severely limited in the United States, however, because it was rati-
fied with several reservations, understandings, and declarations.
1 44
One of the declarations provides that Articles one through twenty-
seven of the ICCPR are non-self-executing, thus requiring that Con-
gress pass enabling legislation before the provisions can be en-
138. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 1, para 3 (identifying as purposes of the United
Nations the promotion and encouragement of "respect for human rights and for fun-
damental freedoms for all"); International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 1904, U.N. GAOR, 18th Sess., Supp. No.
15, at 35, U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (opened for signature Mar. 7,
1966, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) (charging states to condemn and eliminate racial
discrimination in all its forms). But see Jo L. Southard, Human Rights Provisions of
the U.N. Charter: The History in U.S. Courts, 1 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 41 (1995)
(explaining that although U.S. courts may be becoming more ready to apply human
rights treaties, courts have declined to apply these treaties in the past, citing the polit-
ical question and non-self-execution doctrines).
139. See infra Part III.A.
140. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966) (opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 1 (1978) [hereinafter
ICCPR].
141. Id. art. 1, para 1.
142. See 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-4784 (1992) (U.S. Senate consented to ratification
on April 2, 1992); 31 I.L.M. 645, 645 (1992) (U.S. deposited ratifying instrument at the
U.N. on June 8, 1992).
143. ICCPR, supra note 140, art. 1, para 3 ("The States Parties to the present Cove-
nant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Gov-
erning and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-
determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations.").
144. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 23, 102 Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 648-60 [hereinafter Senate ICCPR Report]; see Ann Fagan
Ginger, The Energizing Effect of Enforcing a Human Rights Treaty, 42 DePaul L.
Rev. 1341 (1993) (exploring how the ICCPR can be enforced despite obstacles).
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forced.'45 Such legislation was not contemplated at the time of
ratification and has not been passed.146
Treaties are not the only international law that can bind the United
States. The second source of international law is customary interna-
tional law.'47 It is created by the consistent practice of nations and
adhered to out of a sense of legal obligation.14 8 Customary interna-
tional law is unwritten and is more amorphous and harder to define
than codified laws but, once established, is nonetheless binding on all
states, even states that disagree with the law.1 49 The Supreme Court
and U.S. circuit courts have held that customary international law is
part of U.S. law.150
There is no customary international law concerning research of in-
digenous peoples' genetic material because the research has not been
around long enough for there to be a generally accepted practice of
nations in this area. Customary international law can, however,
145. Senate ICCPR Report, supra note 144, at 659; see Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534
F.2d 24, 30 (2d Cir. 1976) ("It is only when a treaty is self-executing, when it
prescribes rules by which private rights may be determined, that it may be relied upon
for the enforcement of such rights."); Restatement (Third), supra note 136, § 111(3)-
(4) (identifying what makes a treaty non-self-executing and stating that non-self-exe-
cuting agreements are only given legal effect by "necessary implementation"); id. cmt.
h (providing a further explanation of non-self-executing treaties).
146. See Senate ICCPR Report, supra note 144, at 657 ("[Existing U.S. law gener-
ally complies with the Covenant; hence, implementing legislation is not
contemplated.").
147. Restatement (Third), supra note 136, § 102(1)(a).
148. Id. § 102(3).
149. Multilateral treaties that are open to all nations are binding on those states
that sign it, but can also evidence customary international law. Id. cnts. f & i. A state
that disagrees with a developing customary international law can escape its binding
effect only if it declares its dissent before the law becomes established. See id. § 102
cmt. b.
150. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that, in the absence
of controlling authority, a court must look to the customs and usages of nations). In
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the Second Circuit recognized that customary international law
grants human rights to all people. 630 F.2d 876 (2d. Cir. 1980). The Filartiga family
brought an action under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994), against
Americo Pena-Irala for his role in the kidnapping and tortured killing of Joelito Filar-
tiga. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. Pena-Irala was the Inspector General of Police in
Auncion, Paraguay at the time of the murder. Id. The family did not argue that their
cause of action arose from a U.S. treaty. See id. at 879. Instead, the Filartigas relied
on customary international law because the United States did not have a torture stat-
ute. The court pointed to U.N. documents, the practice of nations, and legal scholar-
ship to support its conclusion that a country's torture of its citizens was a violation of
the law of nations under the statute. Id. at 880-84. The court in Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), refused to expand the acts that would
qualify as violations of the law of nations to include terrorism and unofficial torture.
But see Andrew M. Scoble, Comment, Enforcing the Customary International Law of
Human Rights in Federal Court, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 127 (1986) (discussing both Filartiga
and Tel-Oren and arguing that the violations of the law of nations, covered by the
Alien Tort Claims Act, should not only include customary international laws that
were recognized when the statute was passed in 1789, but also those that develop
later).
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evolve when states consistently recognize the rights of indigenous peo-
ples to control their genetic material out of a sense of legal obligation.
When such a uniform practice is eventually established, it will consti-
tute customary international law.
Indigenous people should not have to wait for a customary interna-
tional law to develop for protection. Not only may customary interna-
tional law take a long time to develop and become recognized,15' but
indigenous people will likely encounter resistance when attempting to
enforce these rights in court because U.S. judges are often hesitant to
recognize claims based on customary international law. 152
This part has illustrated that neither domestic common law nor in-
ternational law provide the protection that indigenous people need.
The next part will demonstrate, however, that protection of indige-
nous peoples' ability to control their genetic material is consistent
with, and advanced by, international human rights law.
PART III. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REEXAMINED
Although neither domestic common law nor international human
rights law adequately address indigenous concerns in this area, a
human rights norm that recognizes indigenous peoples' right to con-
151. There is no requirement, however, that state practice continue for a long time
to establish a customary international law. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969
I.C.J. 3, 44-45; Restatement (Third), supra note 136, § 102 reporters' note 2.
Although a uniform practice that qualifies as customary international law may take a
while to develop, there is no legal barrier to a more immediate recognition of that
law. See id. Thus, a customary international law recognizing indigenous peoples' right
to control their genetic material could develop and become binding very quickly.
152. See Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in
United States Courts: A Comparative Perspective. 14 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1, 28 (1992)
(suggesting that the ambiguities of customary international law are one reason why
courts often decline to use it to enforce human rights); Paul L. Hoffman, The "Blank
Stare Phenomenon". Proving Customary International Law in U.S. Courts, 25 Ga. J.
Int'l & Comp. L. 181, 182 (1995/96) ("[J]udicial skepticism is one of the largest obsta-
cles for a lawyer trying to use customary law in domestic litigation.").
A current discussion about whether human rights should be recognized as federal
common law and binding on the United States without action of the political branches
of our government could prove to be another hurdle. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the
Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815 (1997) (arguing that U.S. courts should not
apply customary international law unless the federal branches of the federal govern-
ment authorize the application); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current
Illegitimacy of International Human Rights Litigation, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 319 (1997)
(responding to critics of their attack on customary international law as federal com-
mon law). But see Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary Interna-
tional Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 Fordham L. Rev.
371, 379-80, 391-92 (1997) (confirming that customary international law is part of fed-
eral common law and creates binding international obligations on the United States);
Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law
After Erie, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 393 (1997) (defending the validity of the modern
position, that it is the role of federal courts to interpret and decide whether to apply
customary international law).
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trol their genetic material is emerging. 53 This right stems from the
well-accepted international human right of self-determination.
A. The Right to Self-Determination in the Context of Indigenous
Genetic Sampling and Patenting
Self-determination is an important human right for indigenous peo-
ples. This part will first explore the scope of the right and conclude
that it may be read broadly. This Note will then show that the right of
self-determination applies to indigenous peoples' genetic material.
1. Defining the Right to Self-Determination
There is no doubt that self-determination is an international human
right.'54 There is little agreement, however, regarding its meaning and
scope.'55 A traditional definition of the right to self-determination,
often referred to as "external self-determination," developed in the
context of decolonization as the group right of a people to define
themselves as a separate international entity.lSb In this context, indig-
enous self-determination is often discussed as a right to complete in-
dependence from the nation in which the group is geographically
153. See infra Part III.B.
154. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text; infra notes 161-62 and accom-
panying text; Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The
Accommodation of Conflicting Rights 27 (1990) [hereinafter Autonomy, Sovereignty,
and Self-Determination] ("Perhaps no contemporary norm of international law has
been so vigorously promoted or widely accepted as the right of all peoples to self-
determination."); Allan Rosas, The Right of Self-Deterinination, in Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights 79,79 (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1995) (explaining the importance
of the right to self-determination through the action of the U.N. Human Rights Com-
mittee); Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 Va. J. Int'l L 1, 31 (1993)
[hereinafter Rethinking Self-Determnination] ("[Slelf-determination has undoubtedly
attained the status of a 'right' in international law."); Jennifer E. Brady, Note, The
Huaorani Tribe of Ecuador: A Study in Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples, 10
Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 291, 298 (1997) (noting that although "the international commu-
nity has embraced the doctrine of self-determination," the term remains politically
charged with "no clear legal definition").
155. See Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, supra note 154, at 27
(stating that the right to self-determination is not well-defined), Rethinking Self-De-
termination, supra note 154, at 2 (noting that the right to self-determination remains
"vague and imprecise"); Jill McC. Watson, Self-Determination of Peoples and Polities,
86 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 369, 369 (1992) (remarks of Frederic L Kirgis, Jr., law
professor at Washington & Lee University) ("Self-determination is one of those nor-
mative propositions that everyone agrees is part of international law. But exactly
what it means is quite another matter."); Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the
Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal Focus?, 16 Mich. J. Int'l L 733, 733 (1995) (re-
viewing Yves Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda and Na-
tional Elections: Self-Determination and Transition to Democracy (1994)) ("Self-
determination is a concept increasingly at war with itself.").
156. See Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 67-
100 (1995); Curtis G. Berkey, International Law and Domestic Courts: Enhancing
Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples, 5 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 65, 77-78 (1992).
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located-one extreme of the political autonomy spectrum. 157 States
whose borders encompass indigenous peoples resist recognizing this
version of the right because the state would be forced to relinquish
control over the land and natural resources of indigenous people-its
territorial integrity would be compromised. 158 The use of self-deter-
mination in this context, however, should not detract from the appli-
cation of the right in other situations.'59
Self-determination encompasses less severe-that is, less threaten-
ing to the political state-collective control rights. A broader defini-
tion of the right, "internal self-determination," is a collective right that
refers to a people's ability to control all aspects of their lives without
challenging the territorial integrity of the nation in which the indige-
nous group is located. 6 ' The 1960 Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 161 declares the right
to self-determination but embodies a crucial limitation of the right.
The declaration was the first U.N. document to state that "[a]ll peo-
ples have the right to self-determination,' 62 but it goes on to add:
"Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national
unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 163
This articulation of the right indicates that states are more willing to
acknowledge the right of self-determination when the impact on the
state is limited.
The human right of self-determination is complex, yet flexible
enough to be defined broadly."6 The broader right of self-determina-
tion is increasingly being advocated as a means to ensure greater au-
157. See Berkey, supra note 156, at 79; Watson, supra note 155, at 391-92 (remarks
of Benedict Kingsbury, law professor at Duke University).
158. See Berkey, supra note 156, at 80.
159. See Cassese, supra note 156, at 349-51; see also Gerry J. Simpson, The Diffu-
sion of Sovereignty: Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Age, 32 Stan. J. Int'l L.
255, 285 (1996) (explaining that the focus on classic colonialism "impoverished the
principle of self-determination and denuded it of the complex underlying ideas of
group participation and self-government").
160. See Cassese, supra note 156, at 101-40.
161. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/
4684 (1960) [hereinafter 1960 Declaration].
162. Id. (emphasis added). Prior to the 1960 Declaration, the United Nations Char-
ter referred to self-determination, but only as a principle, not as a right. U.N. Charter
art. 1, para 2 ("The Purposes of the United Nations are ... [t]o develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples. .. ").
163. 1960 Declaration, supra note 161.
164. See Eric Kolodner, The Future of the Right to Self-Determination, 10 Conn. J.
Int'l L. 153, 154 (1994) ("Rather than abandoning self-determination principles, the
international community must readjust its conception of self-determination to address
the changing needs of a post-Cold War world."); Simpson, supra note 159, at 258
(arguing for the widening and enriching of the right to self-determination).
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tonomy for indigenous peoples. 16- Nations are more receptive to
indigenous claims of self-determination that do not entail territorial
sovereignty.166 The attempt to employ internal self-determination to
protect interests of indigenous peoples, however, is sometimes dis-
missed by those who argue that self-determination is not able to sup-
port all grievances of indigenous peoples.' 67 Those who would limit
the right demand evidence that there is widespread recognition of the
specific application of the broader right claimed. 16 The idea that the
right to self-determination is already fully formed and limited to its
narrow definition, however, limits a tool that could be used to combat
new challenges faced by indigenous groups. 169 The indigenous rights
fairly encompassed in self-determination only recently have been de-
fined,'17 and the definition continually expands. 17 1
165. See Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context
1011 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 1996) ("[T]here is a developing tendency
to grant certain rights, increasingly referred to as self-determination rights, to indige-
nous peoples."); Berkey, supra note 156, at 81 ("For indigenous peoples, including
American Indians, the right of self-determination is gradually becoming part of cus-
tomary international law."). Post-colonial self-determination will provide a greater
range of human rights to a broader scope of peoples. See id. at 81 ("There are increas-
ing signs that international law will accommodate the aspiration of indigenous peoples
for self-determination."); Rethinking Self-Determination, supra note 154; Raidza
Torres, The Rights of Indigenous Populations: The Emerging International Norm, 16
Yale J. Int'l L. 127, 142 (1991); see also Kolodner, supra note 164, at 154 ("[Tlhe
international community can simultaneously promote human rights and world stabil-
ity only if it cautiously supports movements for external self-determination and ac-
tively encourages movements for internal self-determination."); cf. Brady, supra note
154 (arguing that the Ecuadorian government should recognize the right of internal
self-determination of the Huaorani, a tribe in Ecuador, allowing them to exercise
greater control over their environment).
166. See Berkey, supra note 156, at 83; Torres, supra note 165, at 162; see also, Fox,
supra note 155, at 736 ("[A]n internal conception of self-determination is slowly gain-
ing acceptance."); cf. Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From
Object to Subject of International Law?, 7 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 33, 35-36 (1994) (noting
that indigenous people may view as racist a definition of self-determination that dis-
courages the disruption of territory because it would draw a distinction between their
rights and the rights of other peoples).
167. See Watson, supra note 155, at 395 (remarks of William S. Grodinsky, chair-
elect of the Canadian Bar Association Native Law Section) ("[P]oliticians tend to ...
simply lump any claim to sovereignty or self-determination in one big package; some
even go to the extreme of ridiculing or trivializing legitimate claims.").
168. See Anthony D'Amato, Human Rights as Part of Customary International
Law: A Plea for Change of Paradigms, 25 Ga. J. Int'l L 47, 49-50 (199596).
169. See S. James Anaya, The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or
Nationality Rights Claims, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 837, 842 (1990) (arguing that discussion of
the right must move past the absolutist terms of independent statehood "if self-deter-
mination is to be meaningful in the context of most current ethnic autonomy claims").
170. Watson, supra note 155, at 394 (remarks of William S. Grodinsky, see supra
note 167).
171. See Anaya, supra note 169, at 841 ("[S]elf-determination arises within interna-
tional law's expanding lexicon of human rights concerns and accordingly is posited as
a fundamental right that attaches collectively to groups of living human beings.").
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2. Self-Determination in the Context of Indigenous Genetic
Research
During United Nations negotiations over the International Cove-
nants on Human Rights,'172 many nations recognized that self-determi-
nation would inevitably be defined broadly. 173 The right to self-
determination today necessarily emerges from its history, but current
formulations of it must respond to present challenges.174 The govern-
ment of the country that the indigenous people inhabit are not their
only oppressors. Rather, as the situation of indigenous sampling and
patenting illustrates, the source of the harm can be other nations and
non-state entities, like corporations. The right to self-determination is
flexible and could include new applications outside of the traditional
context.175
The group right of an indigenous people to decide whether, and to
what extent, to participate in genetic research should be recognized as
within the scope of self-determination. First, heightened protection
for indigenous people can be justified because they are uniquely vul-
nerable. 176 Second, indigenous peoples are being uniquely targeted
for genetic research, but there is no mechanism beyond private con-
tract to ensure that they will benefit from the research. Thus, indige-
nous peoples' interests are not likely to be protected through the
policymaking process because their interests are at least different
from, and possibly adverse to, those of who define the agenda. Fur-
ther, the expanding right to self-determination supports the emerging
international norm, discussed below, which recognizes indigenous
peoples' right to control genetic research.
172. The International Covenants on Human Rights include the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 140, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 3 (opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), S. Exec. Doc. D, 95-2, at 1 (1978). See
Louis Henkin, The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights 1 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); Richard B. Lillich & Hurst Hannum, International
Human Rights: Problems of Law, Policy, and Practice 189-90 (1995). The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948)
[hereinafter Universal Declaration], includes a list of human rights that was approved
without dissent because it was meant to be an unenforceable, aspirational document.
Henkin, supra, at 9-11. The International Covenants on Human Rights were drafted
to give legal effect to the goals set out in the Universal Declaration. Id.
173. Rethinking Self-Determination, supra note 154, at 23-24.
174. See Olivia Q. Goldman, Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Self-Determina-
tion, 87 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 190, 191 (1993) (remarks by Howard R. Berman,
professor at California Western School of Law) ("History is relevant [to the problems
faced by indigenous people today], but our solutions must be contemporary.").
175. See Anaya, supra note 169, at 842 ("[T]he concept of self-determination is
capable of embracing much more nuanced interpretations and applications, particu-
larly in an increasingly interdependent world in which the formal attributes of state-
hood mean less and less.").
176. For example, indignenous peoples do not speak the same language as the re-
searchers and are not familiar with the concepts of genetics and intellectual property.
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The question arises of whether the human right to self-determina-
tion is so broad as to secure the right to control one's genetic material
to all people. That is, should a person like Moore prevail on a self-
determination theory by virtue of his being human? Currently, the
substantive elements of the international human right to self-determi-
nation apply to groups and individuals, but remedies based on the
right are limited to groups.17 7 This Note focuses on self-determination
as a group right. Whatever the potential breadth of self-determina-
tion, 78 any international conceptualization of the right at least must
include indigenous autonomy and consensual action. 179
It is important to realize, however, that the recognition of a group
right creates a tension with individual rights and the prospect of the
individual dissenter.8 In the context of indigenous genetic sampling
and patenting, this problem could arise in at least two situations. The
first is where the group decides that it does not want to participate in
the research while an individual does. The other is the opposite situa-
tion, where the group wants to participate, but an individual does not
want to participate. In the latter scenario, although the dissenter may
not be forced to actively participate in the research by contributing
her personal genetic material, researchers could learn information
about her similar genetic makeup through their research on the will-
ing group participants. In both cases the individual loses control if the
177. See Indigenous Peoples in International Law, supra note 5, at 80 (-[W]hile the
substantive elements of self-determination apply broadly to benefit all segments of
humanity, self-determination applies more narrowly in its remedial aspect. Remedial
prescriptions and mechanisms developed by the international community necessarily
only benefit groups that have suffered violations of substantive self-determination.").
178. Perhaps a person in Moore's position could successfully argue that the right to
self-determination includes a general right of all individuals to control their genetic
material. Even if the international human rights conceptualization of self-determina-
tion has not expanded to embrace such a claim, the domestic common law right of
self-determination, generally recognized as an individual right, might apply. The term
self-determination has been imbued with the idea of bodily integrity and could be
applied to allow for greater control of the individual over her body. See Cruzan v.
Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Be-
cause our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical free-
dom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state incursions into the
body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause.").
179. See Goldman, supra note 174, at 192 (remarks by Berman) ("[lindigenous con-
trol and consent are the measure by which international action must be evaluated.");
Watson, supra note 155, at 394 (remarks of Grodinsky, see supra 167) ("'[Sielf-deter-
mination' and 'sovereignty'-are not part of the vocabulary of native people. We
tend to impose our words and concepts on them, not listening to what they have in
mind with respect to self-determination and sovereignty.").
180. This perceived tension, however, may not be as imbedded in indigenous cul-
tures as it is in Western culture. See Robert N. Clinton, The Rights of Indigenous
Peoples as Collective Group Rights, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 739 (1990) ("To Native Ameri-
cans .... group and individual rights are not antithetical concepts, they are compli-
mentary concepts."); Iles, supra note 25, at 52 ("[T]he bias towards individualism
ignores the complex ways in which human rights promote groups and group interac-
tion in social life.").
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
group right is permitted to trump the individual's right.'81 Although
this conflict raises difficult policy questions, the difficulty is not a
product of recognizing a right of self-determination in this context.
Rather, recognizing the right would create a sphere of protection in
which the conflict between group and individual interests could be ne-
gotiated within the indigenous community.
To sufficiently protect the rights of indigenous people, an attempt
must be made to involve them at all levels of discussions that impact
their rights. Indigenous peoples themselves can best evaluate how to
formulate the right in a manner that adequately protects them.182 Un-
fortunately, indigenous groups have been excluded from participating
in some of these forums. For example, when the First International
Conference on DNA Sampling was held on September 6-8, 1996, in
Montreal, 83 it was attended mostly by academics. While billed as an
open examination of the ethical, legal, and policy concerns surround-
ing the collection and patenting of human blood and tissue samples,
indigenous groups were not invited to participate in the conference.'
During the conference, indigenous rights advocates organized by Ru-
ral Advancement and Cultural Survival Canada staged a protest of the
exclusion. 85 Indigenous voices must be heard and heeded if world
policy is to possess any legitimacy. 186 The next part illustrates that
several groups recognize indigenous peoples' right to control their ge-
netic material.
B. Evidence of an Emerging Norm
An international norm consists of a pattern of communication and
responses given by international organizations and states to new issues
that have not been in dispute long enough for a customary interna-
tional law to form.' 87 The standard for formulating a norm is less
181. Whether the group right should be able to trump an individual right is beyond
the scope of this Note. There have been no reports to date of instances where there
was an individual dissenter, however. It may be that dissenters do not voice objec-
tions in their communities, or are not heard by the press. Although there has not yet
been evidence of the group/individual tension, the possibility poses a serious concern
nonetheless.
182. Kastrup, supra note 5, at 122 (arguing that indigenous self-determination must
be recognized because indigenous peoples best understand their own needs).
183. Paul Weinberg, Indigenous Groups Target "Vampire Project," Inter Press Ser-
vice, Sept. 9, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11625270.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International
Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the
World, 1990 Duke L.J. 660 (describing the direct participation of indigenous peoples
in the drafting of the U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
discussed infra part III.B.1); see also Barsh, supra note 5, at 783-86 (describing contin-
ued indigenous participation in the process of drafting the U.N. Draft Declaration).
187. See Indigenous Peoples in International Law. supra note 5, at 50; Torres, supra
note 165, at 145.
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stringent than for a customary international law because a norm does
not require identical formulations or a uniform response." In this
context, an emerging norm results when the dialogue between indige-
nous peoples and their advocates, state governments, international or-
ganizations, commercial actors, and academics begin to form a
patterned response to a problem confronting indigenous people. 189
Although not binding on states, evidence of emerging norms antici-
pates what may develop into positive law or become recognized as
customary international law. Thus, such emerging norms may eventu-
ally be binding on states. If a norm is identified as emerging, or estab-
lished, the norm should positively affect state behavior.19
An international norm that recognizes the legal personality and
rights of indigenous people is emerging. 191 A similar norm specifically
addressing indigenous sampling and patenting is also emerging. A
patterned response to indigenous genetic research is developing as is
evidenced by documents produced by international organizations,
such as the United Nations, indigenous bodies, and the research com-
munity. The organizations that have confronted this issue have uni-
formly concluded that genetic research, if done at all, must only be
conducted with the fully informed consent of the indigenous peoples.
1. U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The Working Group on Indigenous Populations of the Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
adopted a Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
("Draft Declaration"). 192 Representatives from many indigenous
groups were involved in the shaping of the draft by offering their
views and suggestions at working group meetings.19 3 Government
representatives are now meeting about the draft in a working group of
188. See Torres, supra note 165, at 145.
189. See Indigenous Peoples in International Law, supra note 5, at 50; Torres, supra
note 165, at 145-46.
190. See Indigenous Peoples in International Law, supra note 5, at 50; Torres, supra
note 165, at 145.
191. See Indigenous Peoples in International Law, supra note 5, at 49-58; see, e.g.,
International Labour Organisation Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples,
Convention No. 169 art. 7 (1989) ("The peoples concerned shall have the right to
decide their own priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives,
beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being .... "); see also Barsh, supra note 166
(describing the progress indigenous peoples have made in securing international rec-
ognition of their rights and legal status).
192. U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Commission
on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protec-
tion of Minorities, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 15, U.N. Doc. E/CNA4Sub.2/19942Add.1
(1994) [hereinafter U.N. Draft Declaration].
193. See Julian Burger, The United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of In-
digenous Peoples, 9 St. Thomas L. Rev. 209 (1996) (providing an overview of the
progress of the Draft Declaration).
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the Commission on Human Rights.' 9 4 The U.N. General Assembly
wants the Draft Declaration adopted by the year 2004, the end of the
Decade of Indigenous People. 195
The Draft Declaration acknowledges the urgent need to recognize
the rights of indigenous peoples. 196 Through recognition of these
rights, indigenous peoples will be empowered to control and promote
their development. 97 Article Three explicitly states that indigenous
peoples have the right of self-determination. 198 Additionally, the
Draft Declaration explicitly states that indigenous peoples' genetic re-
sources are entitled to special protection. 99 The draft acknowledges
that indigenous peoples are entitled to the full ownership and control
of their cultural property, which specifically includes human genetic
resources2 00 The draft further recognizes the right of indigenous peo-
ples to protect their cultural property and obtain restitution for prop-
erty taken from them without their free and informed consent.2 '
The International Bioethics Committee, established by the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
194. See Barsh, supra note 5 (detailing indigenous and state participation in the
continued drafting).
195. G.A. Res. 48/163, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 281, U.N. Doc. A/
48/49 (1993).
196. U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 192, at 2 ("Recognizing the urgent need to
respect and promote the inherent rights and characteristics of indigenous peoples,
especially their rights to their lands, territories and resources, which derive from their
political, economic and social structures and from their cultures, spiritual traditions,
histories and philosophies . . ").
197. Id. ("Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over developments affect-
ing them and their lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain and
strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, and to promote their develop-
ment in accordance with their aspirations and needs . . ").
198. Id. Part I, art. 3 ("Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.").
199. Id. Part VI, art. 29.
200. Part VI, art. 29 of the U.N. Draft Declaration states:
Indigenous peoples are entitled to the recognition of the full ownership,
control and protection of their cultural and intellectual property.
They have the right to special measures to control, develop and protect
their sciences, technologies and cultural manifestations, including human
and other genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of
fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs and visual and perform-
ing arts.
Id. (emphasis added).
201. Part III, art. 12 of the U.N. Draft Declaration states:
Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural
traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and de-
velop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as
archaeological and historical sites, artifacts, designs, ceremonies, technolo-
gies and visual and performing arts and literature, as well as the right to the
restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken
without their free and informed consent or in violation of their laws, tradi-
tions and customs.
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("UNESCO") in 1992, prepared and finalized the Revised Prelimi-
nary Draft of a Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and
Human Rights.20 2 On July 26, 1997, an intergovernmental committee
adopted the draft, which will be submitted to the UNESCO General
Conference for adoption this year.203 The draft covers all human gen-
ome research, not just that involving indigenous peoples. The drafters
recognized the vast potential benefit that human genome research
might yield, but proclaim that no genetic research application should
be granted to the detriment of human dignity and human rights."z '
Human genome research should only be conducted in accordance
with law, and with the prior, free, and informed consent of the sub-
ject.20 5 The draft calls on researchers to act with caution and integ-
rity.206 Article 16 charges nations with the responsibility to prevent
abuses in genome research.20 7 Article 19 requires all states to take
"all appropriate measures" to ensure implementation of the draft's
principles.208
2. Indigenous Declarations
Indigenous peoples have also addressed the issue of genetic re-
search. A group of indigenous peoples from Asia produced the Sabah
Statement at a regional meeting in 1995.2o The participants squarely
addressed the issue of genetic sampling and patenting, recognizing the
practice as neocolonialism.210 They also concluded that control over
the indigenous peoples' genetic material was inseparable from their
struggle for self-determination. 211 The invasive actors were identified
as "transnational corporations[,] . . . institutions, researchers and
scientists who are after the profits and benefits gained through mo-
nopoly control. '212 The statement describes the patent process as a
foreign mechanism213 that works "to exploit the indigenous knowl-
202. UNESCO July 29, 1997 Release about Declaration on Human Genome and
Human Rights (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <httpJ/vww.eurekalert.org/summaries
1120.html>.
203. Id.
204. Revised Preliminary Draft of a Universal Declaration on the Human Genome
and Human Rights, UNESCO Int'l Bioethics Comm., art. 5 (1997) [hereinafter
Human Genomne Draft Declaration].
205. Id. art. 6(a)-(b).
206. Id. art. 10.
207. Id. art. 16.
208. Id art. 19.
209. Sabah Statement, supra note 42.
210. See id.
211. See id ("[T]he struggle for self-determination cannot be separated from the
campaign against intellectual property rights systems, particularly their applications
on life forms and indigenous knowledge.").
212. Id.
213. Id. ("For the indigenous people of Asia, the intellectual property rights system
is not only a very new concept but it is also very western.").
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edge and resources of the indigenous peoples. ,214 This system is unfa-
miliar to indigenous peoples and its use by industrialized nations
engenders a reaction of frustration and resentment among indigenous
peoples.215
Another regional meeting of indigenous peoples yielded the Decla-
ration of Indigenous Peoples of the Western Hemisphere Regarding the
Human Genome Diversity Project.2 1 6 The participants believe it is the
responsibility of indigenous peoples "to insure [that] the continuity of
the natural order of all life is maintained for generations to come. "217
This end can only be achieved by respecting and not tampering with
the natural order of life.2" 8 Because the indigenous representatives
view genetic technology as antithetical to nature, the declaration re-
jects the patenting of all genetic materials.2 1 9 The declaration specifi-
cally speaks out against the Diversity Project and its plan to collect
indigenous genetic material.220 The declaration urges the interna-
tional community to develop binding agreements that similarly pro-
tect all forms of life.22'
214. Id.
215. Id. ("The intellectual property rights system and the (mis)appropriation of in-
digenous knowledge without the prior knowledge and consent of indigenous peoples
evoke feelings of anger, of being cheated, and of helplessness in knowing nothing
about intellectual property rights and indigenous knowledge piracy.").
216. Phoenix Declaration, supra note 42.
217. Id.
218. Id. ("The principle of harmony requires that we do not violate the principles of
Creation by manipulating and changing the natural order.").
219. The drafters of this declaration apparently would not approve of any genetic
research involving indigenous peoples, notwithstanding informed consent and com-
pensation. The declaration explains that:
In the long history of destruction which has accompanied western coloniza-
tion we have come to realize that the agenda of the non-indigenous forces
has been to appropriate and manipulate the natural order for the purposes
of profit, power and control.
To negate the complexity of any life form by isolating and reducing it to its
minute parts, western science and technologies diminishes [sic] its identity as
a precious and unique life form, and alters its relationship to the natural
order.
Genetic technologies which manipulate and change the fundamental core
and identity of any life form is an absolute violation of these principles and
creates the potential for unpredictable and therefore dangerous
consequences.
Therefore, we the Indigenous Peoples participating in this meeting repre-
senting communities from North, Central and South America reject all pro-
grams involving genetic technology.
Id.; see also id. ("We hold that life cannot be bought, owned[,] sold, discovered or
patented, even in its smallest form.").
220. Id.
221. Id.
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3. Diversity Project's Model Ethical Protocol
The scientific community, interested in gaining access to indigenous
genetic material, recognizes the need to obtain informed consent of
the indigenous peoples. Consequently, the North American Regional
Committee of the proposed Human Genome Diversity Project has de-
veloped the Model Protocol mentioned above. " ' In developing the
Model Protocol, the Diversity Project considered the principles of in-
formed consent, respect for indigenous people's culture, and adher-
ence to international human rights standards.2- 3 The document
tackles a number of difficult questions surrounding the issue of indige-
nous genetic sampling, including informed consent, compensation,
patenting, ownership, and control." 4 The Model Protocol deals with
the issues of informed consent in the greatest depth. Recognizing that
it was demanding a requirement beyond existing law, the Diversity
Project insists that consent be obtained from the relevant govern-
ments, the indigenous people as a group, and the individuals
themselves.'
The documents discussed above represent responses from interna-
tional governing bodies, indigenous organizations, and the scientific
community. Some of the groups that have considered the issue have
determined that indigenous peoples have the right to control their ge-
netic material and that researchers must obtain an indigenous people's
informed consent before involving them in research. Other groups
have rejected genetic research and patenting outright. Although the
conclusions are not identical, they have a common denominator. In-
deed, an international norm is emerging-that the indigenous peoples
themselves must control whether and to what extent to participate in
genetic research. The U.S. government itself has begun to participate
in advancing the norm as was evidenced by its decision to withdraw
the Guaymi patent." 6 This Note now argues that the United States
should strengthen its support of human rights by passing legislation
acknowledging the right of indigenous peoples to control their genetic
material and creating causes of action for meaningful enforcement of
that right.
222. See supra notes 27, 35-41 and accompanying text.
223. See Model Protocol, supra note 27, at 1436.
224. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
225. Model Protocol, supra note 27, at 1437.
226. See supra note 83 and accompanying text; see also Indigenous Peoples in Inter-
national Law, supra note 5, at 50 ("[C]onforming conduct %ill strengthen emergent
customary rules by enhancing attendant subjectivities of expectation.").
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PART IV. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD RECOGNIZE THE
EMERGING HUMAN RIGHTS NORM
Research groups, drug companies, and governments have been op-
erating in a virtual legal and ethical vacuum."2 7 As discussed above,
no positive law instruments exist that directly address genetic sam-
pling and patenting." 8 In addition, no clear duty arises from custom-
ary international law because indigenous genetic sampling and
patenting has not been practiced long enough for a widespread prac-
tice to exist. 229
As established above, however, the human right to self-determina-
tion is broad and should be recognized as encompassing an indigenous
people's absolute right to decide whether to participate in genetic re-
search.230 An emerging international norm also exists which recog-
nizes that any indigenous genetic research and patenting should only
be done with an indigenous people's informed consent.23a The docu-
ments that international and indigenous governing bodies and the sci-
entific community have created and continue to draft evidence an
emerging norm that is gaining widespread acceptance.232 It may only
be a matter of time before a more formal customary international law
develops.
This part argues that Congress should pass legislation recognizing
indigenous peoples' absolute right to decide whether to participate in
genetic research.233 This legislation would create causes of action, for
both injunctive relief and compensatory damages, where indigenous
peoples' genetic material is used without their fully informed consent,
227. See Michael J. Malinowski & Maureen A. O'Rourke, A False Start? The Im-
pact of Federal Policy on the Genotechnology Industry, 13 Yale J. on Reg. 163, 248
(1996) ("The gap between genotechnologies and the regulatory infrastructure bearing
upon the introduction and uses of genotechnologies has broadened.").
228. See supra notes 136-46 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
230. See supra Part III.A.
231. See supra Part III.B.
232. See supra notes 192-225 and accompanying text.
233. Some groups have called for a moratorium on indigenous genetic research. See
supra note 63; Moratorium Sought on DNA Sampling, supra note 26; see also Final
Statement from the UNDP Consultation on Indigenous Peoples' Knowledge and Intel-
lectual Property Rights, Suva, Fiji, April 1995 (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://
users.ox.ac.uk/-wgtrr/suva.htm> ("Call[ing] for a moratorium on bioprospecting in
the Pacific and urg[ing] indigenous peoples not to co-operate in bioprospecting activi-
ties until appropriate protection mechanisms are in place."); Mataatua Declaration on
Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Whakatane, New
Zealand, June 12-18, 1993 (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://users/ox.ac.uk/-wgtrr/
mataatua.htm> ("A moratorium on any further commercialisation of indigenous me-
dicinal plants and human genetic materials must be declared until indigenous commu-
nities have developed appropriate protection mechanisms."). Restrictions must be
developed immediately to protect indigenous peoples before comprehensive legal
safeguards are available. Any protective prohibition, however, must allow for the
continued participation of groups like the Sandy Lake Band, supra note 72, who are
fully informed and are participating in the research to benefit their community.
[Vol. 66
1997] INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION
and adequate compensation.3 To ensure protection for indigenous
peoples who have only had contact with researchers, as was the case
with hypothetical Groups Two and Three, the statute must impose a
duty to fully inform research subjects on those scientists, researchers,
companies, organization, or governments that conduct, control, fund,
or contract for the benefits of indigenous genetic research. To further
ensure that all indigenous peoples receive the maximum coverage, the
statute must recognize a property right in their genetic material. Con-
gress must act to prevent neocolonialism and to advance global
human rights.
A. Congress Must Act to Avoid Neocolonialism
The relationship between indigenous populations and the dominant
cultures today is structurally similar to colonialism. - 5 European colo-
nizers employed theories and concepts to legitimize their control over
remote territories and peoples." 6 History is replete with examples of
234. The Genetic Privacy Act would recognize a genetic source's property right in
individually identifiable DNA. Genetic Privacy Act, § 104(a) (1995) (drafted by
George J. Annas et al.) (visited Nov. 2, 1997) <http://www-busph.bu.eduDeptsLWI
GPA/GPA.htm>; see also Michael MJ. Lin, Conferring a Federal Property Right in
Genetic MateriaL" Stepping into the Future with the Genetic Privacy Act, 22 Am. J.L &
Med. 109 (1996) (comparing the Genetic Privacy Act to proposed state and federal
legislation, and arguing for the Genetic Privacy Act). This proposed legislation would
not, however, adequately address the unique issues surrounding indigenous genetic
research, for example, traditional or group consent and neocolonialism.
235. See Goldman, supra note 174, at 190 (remarks by Berman, see supra note 174)
(noting that indigenous peoples were the first victims of colonialism and continue to
be its victims today). For one definition of colonialism, see Jtrgen Osterhammel's
Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview:
Colonialism is a relationship of domination between an indigenous (or forci-
bly imported) majority and a minority of foreign invaders. The fundamental
decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and imple-
mented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in
a distant metropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized
population, the colonizers are convinced of their own superiority and of
their ordained mandate to rule.
JXirgen Osterhammel, Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview 16-17 (1997) (emphasis
in original). Osterhammel also notes that colonialism is "not just any relationship
between masters and servants, but one in which an entire society is robbed of its
historical line of development, externally manipulated and transformed according to
the needs and interests of the colonial rulers." Id. at 15 (emphasis in original).
236. For example, during classical colonialism, prior occupancy by indigenous
populations "was commonly thought not to matter." Jesse Dukeminier & James E.
Krier, Property 12 (3d ed. 1993); see Goldman, supra note 174, at 190 (remarks by
Berman, see supra note 174) (pointing to "the right of discovery," "terra nullius," and
the "standard of civilization"); see, e.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
(1823) (affirming U.S. title to land previously inhabited solely by the native popula-
tion based on concepts of discovery, conquest, and labor theory), see also, Williams,
supra note 186, at 672-76 (discussing the doctrine of discovery and its impact on indig-
enous rights). But see W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, Protecting Indige-
nous Rights in International Adjudication, 89 Am. J. Int'l L 350 (1995) (arguing that
the theories used to exercise dominance of indigenous peoples should be called into
question and brought in line with contemporary international law to protect the inter-
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industrialized nations appropriating the resources of indigenous popu-
lations for their own gain.237 Indigenous groups were, and continue to
be, vulnerable without the power to influence major decisions that im-
pact their lives. Neocolonialism is the indirect economic and cultural
dominance of one nation over a people, even when the dominant na-
tion does not have direct control over the government of the
subordinate people.2 38
Even though genetic sampling and patenting is considered accepta-
ble in the United States, the practice smacks of neocolonialism when
it involves indigenous peoples. 239 Some indigenous people are wor-
ried that, without a legal framework in place, they will be exploited
ests of indigenous peoples); cf Berkey, supra note 156 (arguing that the emerging
international norm of self-determination should inform interpretation of domestic law
and that U.S. courts should recognize a more expansive view of Native American self-
government).
237. Outsiders, for example, have attempted to convince the Guaymi to cooperate
with plans to acquire their natural resources. In the 1970s, one of the world's largest
copper deposits was found in Panama. Chris N. Gjording, Conditions Not of Their
Choosing: The Guaymi Indians and Mining Multinationals in Panama ix (George
Vranas & Peter Johnson eds., 1991). The discovery prompted the interest of multina-
tional mining firms. Id. at 3. Debate about the project included the Panamanian gov-
ernment, the mining companies, and major Panamanian business associations, but
ignored the views of the Guaymi. In response to the proposed project, the Guaymi
Congress stated that, "the Guaymf people want progress and development but not in
the form that the State... wants to impose, via huge projects that guarantee no real
benefit and which only proceed in detriment of the Guaymf people toying with them
via promises." Id. at 5 (quoting Congresos Guaymfes 1980:48).
238. See Robert W. Tucker, The Inequality of Nations 68 (1977); see, e.g., Naomi
Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and Techni-
cal Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 Mich. J. Int'l L. 919 (1996)
(describing the appropriation of indigenous knowledge by the biotechnology, phar-
maceutical, and agribusiness industries, universities, seed and gene banks, and re-
search centers; suggesting possible frameworks for ending the appropriation); see also
William H. Blanchard, Neocolonialism American Style, 1960-2000, at 5 (1996) (char-
acterizing sustained intervention on the part of the United States and the "slow devel-
opment of a long-term relationship of dominance over another nation" as
neocolonialism); Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, The United States and the Philippines:
A Study of Neocolonialism xiv-xv (1981) (offering a definition of neocolonialism that
parallels colonialism because, in both cases, the dominant classes of two nations cre-
ate an alliance by which they can both maintain dominance over the weaker nation's
population).
239. Debra Harry, a Pauite Indian from Nevada and a leading advocate for indige-
nous peoples stated: "Now it's colonialism on the molecular level .... For us, genes
are our ancestry, our heredity and our future generations. They are not to be tam-
pered with." Horvitz, supra note 65. Aroha Mead is a lobbyist with the Maori Con-
gress, who has served with the government's Health Research Council and also
organized a United Nations conference on indigenous intellectual property rights.
She stated: "This is like slavery in a high-tech science world .... You are taking the
lifeblood of individuals and asserting ownership. It is bad enough that you do it to
your own citizens, but much worse to do it to people of other countries." Roger
Highfield, 'Biopiracy' Claim After Patent on Blood Cell, Daily Telegraph, Feb. 13,
1996, at 15, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Papers File.
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for their genetic material.24 Others have concerns that the unfamiliar
intellectual property system will be used to harm them.24' One com-
mentator noted that the industrialized nations now interested in using
indigenous peoples to advance their goals have long ignored difficult
problems facing indigenous groups.242
In 1960, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.2 43
The declaration's drafters were "[a]ivare of the increasing conflicts re-
sulting from the denial of or impediments in the way of the freedom of
such peoples, which constitute a serious threat to world peace." 24
The drafters had an expansive view of the forms undesirable colonial-
ism could take.245 The declaration demands the immediate end to
domination of peoples and a transfer of power to them. 24 6 The Gen-
eral Assembly Declaration is evidence of customary international law,
which would bind the United States to end all forms of colonialism. 247
To comply with the declaration and prevent U.S. entities from engag-
ing in neocolonialism, Congress must pass legislation that provides re-
dress for indigenous peoples and stiff sanctions for offenders.
B. Policy Supports Congressional Action
Other important factors should motivate congressional action. Such
legislation would capitalize on an excellent opportunity to lead the
world by example and increase the United States' ability to advance
240. The Third World is wary because "[w]ithout a clear legal framework forcing
drug multinationals to share the wealth, they worry that the companies will abscond
with both the blueprint for their 'biodiversity' and its rewards." Neil Gross & John
Carey, Who Owns the Tree of Life?, Bus. Wk., Nov. 4, 1996, at 194, 197. Leonora
Zalabta of the Arhuaco people of Colombia said, "[tihis could be another form of
exploitation, only this time they are using us as raw materials." Patenting Indigenous
People, supra note 42.
241. COICA Statement, supra note 135, ("The prevailing intellectual property sys-
tems must be prevented from robbing us, through monopoly rights, of resources and
knowledge in order to enrich themselves and build up power opposed to our own.");
Sabah Statement, supra note 42 ("The prevailing intellectual property rights system is
seen as a new form of colonization and a tactic by the industrialized countries of the
North to confuse and to divert the struggle of indigenous peoples from their rights to
land and resources on, above and under it.").
242. Alan Swedlund, University of Massachusetts anthropology department head,
charges that the project managers "want to swoop in, collect blood for their own sci-
entific goals and then leave people to their fate." Horvitz, supra note 65.
243. G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc.
A/4684 (1960), supra note 161.
244. Id (second emphasis added).
245. Id ("[T]he peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its
manifestations." (emphasis added)).
246. Id. ("Immediate steps shall be taken ... to transfer all powers to the peoples
... in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.").
247. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. United States). 1986 I.CJ.
14 (June 27) (recognizing a U.N. General Assembly Resolution as evidence of cus-
tomary international law).
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worldwide recognition of human rights. Even though all of the pat-
enting nations have not yet decided to recognize claims of indigenous
peoples who have grievances stemming from use of their genetic ma-
terial, the United States, as a world leader, is uniquely situated to do
so. Moreover, the United States has a responsibility to force dialogue
and encourage action in this area.248 Such a response would be in
keeping with past U.S. policy and would encourage the development
of human rights.2 49 Other nations will more readily accept indigenous
peoples' claims once the wall of state inaction is breached by a corner-
stone. Congressional action would enable indigenous peoples' right to
control their genetic material to become customary international law
sooner and, as a result, the right would be binding on all states. In-
deed, action by the United States would itself be considered further
evidence of the emerging norm to protect the right of indigenous peo-
ples to control their genetic material.
Furthermore, congressional action will give the United States more
leverage when demanding that other nations improve their human
rights records. The United States will demonstrate its concern about
the rights of indigenous peoples to the rest of the world. An improve-
ment in U.S. policy in this arena is sorely needed. For example, a
London paper ran a highly unfavorable story about the Hagahai pat-
ent entitled "U.S. Slaps Patent on Tribesman's DNA."25 U.S. calls
for other countries to improve their human rights records will be less
effective when the international community has this image of U.S.
human rights policy.2" By passing legislation now that provides pro-
tection for indigenous peoples, the United States can generate
favorable publicity that will lend credence to U.S. requests for recog-
nition and respect of international human rights.252
248. See Warren Christoper, Commemorating Human Rights Day, U.S. Dep't St.
Dispatch, Dec. 16, 1996, at 607 ("[U.S.] commitment to human rights .... is a respon-
sibility that comes with our leadership in the world, and a quality that strengthens our
ability to lead.").
249. See Michael Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Golden Door, 1993 Wis. L.
Rev. 965, 1020-21. Much of U.S. policy has been aimed at attempting to improve
human rights in other countries. See, e.g., Christopher, supra note 248, at 607 (stating
that defense of human rights is a fundamental interest in which he had insisted that
foreign policy be grounded); White House Press Release, A Proclamation by Presi-
dent Clinton, Dec. 10, 1996 ("[T]he championing of democracy and human rights
serves as a cornerstone of my Administration's foreign policy."); White House Press
Release, Statement by the Press Secretary, Apr. 15, 1997 ("By taking a stand against
human rights abuses in China and around the world, we keep faith with those who
champion these principles. We also maintain our leadership on human rights issues
and express the deepest values of the American people.").
250. Geoffrey Lean & Tom Wilkie, U.S. Slaps Patent on Tribesman's DNA, In-
dependent, Nov. 19, 1995, at 1.
251. See, e.g., Christopher, supra note 248, at 608 (discussing diplomatic efforts to
promote human rights in China, Cuba, Burma, and Nigeria).
252. Id. ("The United States is still looked at around the world as the beacon of
freedom, and what we say means a great deal. What America says and does always
matters.").
[Vol. 66
INDIGENOUS SELF-DETERMINATION
One of the reasons for conducting research on indigenous genome
is for scientists to possibly develop a product to prevent or cure dis-
ease. If Congress fails to act, and indigenous peoples continue to be
taken advantage of, eventually they will collectively decide to with-
hold all cooperation with genetic research. The international commu-
nity must impose stringent guidelines for genetic research and provide
meaningful remedies if it wants to maintain access to the potential
benefits of indigenous genome. These sanctions must not only at-
tempt to reimburse the victims, but to act as strong deterrents to abu-
sive researchers. 53
Should Congress pass legislation to protect indigenous people, it
would not be the first time it acted to advance the nation's human
rights goals." 4 In 1986, Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act (the "Act") over a presidential veto. -5 The Act pro-
hibited certain commercial transactions between U.S. firms and the
South African government and businesses. For example, it prohibited
loans to the South African government or institutions controlled by
the government256 and prohibited new investment in the country by
U.S. nationals." 7 The Act also prohibited the export of several goods
to South Africa," 8 and the import of many South African goods into
the United States. 59 In addition, Congress put some teeth into the
legislation by passing the Rangel Amendment -6 which was a change
in the tax law that effectively doubled the tax paid by U.S. corpora-
tions on income earned in South Africa-making it extremely expen-
sive to do business in South Africa. The economic sanctions aimed at
the South African government succeeded both in advancing human
rights goals and eventually aided in toppling the apartheid regime.261
253. See, e.g., Susan M. Kuzma, Criminal Liability for Misconduct in Scientific Re-
search, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 357 (arguing that criminal sanctions should be im-
posed against researchers for scientific misconduct).
254. See American Indian Religious Freedom Act, Pub. L No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469(1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1996 (1994)) (declaring the "policy of the United States
to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to be-
lieve, express, and exercise the traditional religions"); see also Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2151(n) (1994) (withholding assistance from countries that en-
gages in gross human rights violations); id. § 2301 (1994) (withholding security assist-
ance from countries that engages in gross human rights violations).
255. Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086 (1986) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5001 (1994))
[hereinafter Anti-Apartheid Act].
256. Id § 5055.
257. Id § 5060.
258. See, e.g., id § 5054 (computers); id. § 5071 (petroleum goods).
259. See, e.g., id § 5059(A) (uranium, textiles, and coal); id. § 5069, 5070 (iron.
steel, and agricultural products).
260. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, § 10,231, 26 U.S.C. § 901(j)
(1988).
261. See Audie Klotz, Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against
Apartheid 151-64 (1995); cf Richard L. Abel, Politics By Other Means: Law in the
Struggle Against Apartheid, 1980-1994 (1995) (analyzing the relationship between
apartheid and South African law and politics).
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If the United States takes the lead by passing legislation in this in-
stance, it will promote an emerging human rights norm and thereby
demonstrate strengthened U.S. commitment to human rights.
CONCLUSION
Sometimes it is less challenging to pay nominal homage to current
formulations of human rights to recast them to fit the modem varia-
tions of traditional violations . 62  The current conceptualization of
human rights must develop because it does not adequately protect in-
digenous peoples who are frequently harmed in the process of mod-
ernization.263 Although it is less important to identify the basis for
enhanced protection to "legitimize" a right, finding equitable solu-
tions that make a difference in people's lives must be the goal. Con-
gress can make that difference by protecting the rights of indigenous
people while helping to keep responsible and fair genetic research via-
ble. The United States has a powerful position in world politics and
this is a perfect opportunity for it to bring the recognition of human
rights into the next century.
262. See Goldman, supra note 174, at 199 (remarks by Richard A. Falk, Center of
International Studies, Princeton University. But see Rethinking Self-Determination,
supra note 154, at 66-67 ("The content of self-determination, like international law, is
in constant evolution... [and] definitions may change," but "redefining 'self-determi-
nation' may be more politically acceptable than attempting to bury it.").
263. See Rethinking Self-Determination, supra note 154, at 68.
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